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Abstract
We analyze the relation between time preferences, study e¤ort, and
academic performance among rst-year business and economics stu-
dents. Time preferences are measured by stated preferences for an im-
mediate payment over larger delayed payments. Data on study e¤orts
are derived from an electronic learning environment, which records the
amount of time students are logged in, the number of exercises gener-
ated, and the fraction of topics completed. Another measure of study
e¤ort is participation in an online summer course. We nd no sta-
tistically signicant relationship between impatience and study e¤ort.
However, we nd that impatient students obtain lower grades and fail
nal exams more often, suggesting that impatient students are of lower
unmeasured ability. Impatient students do not earn signicantly fewer
study credits, nor are they more likely to drop out as a result of earning
fewer study credits than required.
JEL-Codes: D03, D90, I21
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1 Introduction
People are often confronted with the choice to take a costly action now in
order to obtain a benet in the future. Although people generally tend to
attach less weight to future outcomes than to present outcomes, there is sub-
stantial heterogeneity in how individuals behave in those kind of situations.
It has been found that experimental measures of individuals time pref-
erences correlate with their alcohol consumption, smoking behavior, body
mass index (Borghans and Golsteyn, 2006; Chabris et al., 2008; Sutter et
al., 2013), and credit card borrowing (Meier and Sprenger, 2010). Di¤er-
ences in individualstime preferences may also help to explain the extent to
which individuals are successful in education. Ultimately, being successful
in education requires putting in e¤ort. Individualschoice of e¤ort typically
involves an intertemporal trade-o¤: e¤ort costs of studying an additional
hour are incurred immediately, while the benets materialize in the future.
We might therefore expect that impatient individuals exert less e¤ort, re-
sulting in lower educational attainment and performance. This hypothesis
holds true regardless of whether one thinks of impatient individuals as ex-
hibiting high exponential discount rates, or as strong hyperbolic discounters,
reecting a self-control problem.1
A number of recent papers nd evidence in line with this hypothesis.
Kirby et al. (2005) nd that, in a sample of undergraduate students of two
American colleges, impatient students have signicantly lower grade point
averages. Cadena and Keys (2015), using panel data representative of the
US population, show that individuals who are classied as impatient by
their interviewer, are more likely to drop out from high school and from
college. Lavecchia et al. (2016) exploit the same data to show that students
classied as impatient report spending fewer study hours. Golsteyn et al.
(2014) link individuals time preferences measured at age 13 with several
outcomes in later life, up to 40 years later. They conclude that individuals
who make impatient choices at age 13 obtain lower grade point averages in
compulsory school and high school, and are less likely to graduate from both
high school and university. De Paola and Gioia (2013) nd that, in a sample
of Italian university students, impatient students obtain lower grades, while
they nd no di¤erences in the number of study credits earned three years
after enrollment.
1The model we have in mind is that individuals trade o¤ future benets and present
costs. In terms of the = model (Laibson 1997), future benets are discounted by t,
where  reects a self-control problem and  is a time-invariant discount factor. The the-
oretical prediction is therefore that impatient individuals study less, regardless of whether
impatience is captured by a low  or a low . Making the distinction between  and 
would be highly relevant from a policy perspective, as the existence of self-control problems
increases the scope for welfare-improving policy interventions. Our measure of time pref-
erences does not distinguish between the two, as reliable measurement of time-inconsistent
preferences is di¢ cult (Dohmen et al. 2012).
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In this paper, we contribute to this literature by investigating the relation
between time preferences, study e¤ort, and academic performance. In con-
trast to previous studies, we explore data on actual study e¤orts rather than
analyzing data on study outcomes only.2 We collect information on study
e¤orts of 794 rst-year business and economics students for an obligatory
course in quantitative methods. An interesting feature of this course is that
students are supposed to practice the course material in an electronic learn-
ing environment, which automatically records for each student the amount
of time logged in, the number of exercises generated, and the percentage
of topics completed without help of the electronic assistance tools. We use
this information as measures of study e¤ort. We further measure e¤ort by
voluntary participation in an online summer course that addresses decien-
cies in basic mathematical skills. We measure performance in the course in
quantitative methods by the nal exam grade and whether this grade was
su¢ cient to pass the course. We do not have information on study e¤ort in
other courses, but our e¤ort measures predict performance in other courses
just as well as in the quantitative methods course. To investigate how impa-
tience relates to rst-year academic performance more broadly, we use four
di¤erent performance measures. The rst two are based on nal exam per-
formance in other rst-year courses: the average grade obtained (excluding
results obtained in re-examinations) and the number of nal exams failed
in the rst attempt. The other two capture study progress: the number
of study credits obtained during the rst year (i.e. the number of courses
passed weighted by the number of study credits assigned to each course), and
whether students fulll the universitys minimum requirements for rst-year
performance. Specically, failing too many courses or both rst-year courses
in quantitative methods leads to exclusion from the study program. Failing
the exam in quantitative methods may therefore have serious consequences.
We measure time preferences by a survey question that confronts students
with three hypothetical choices between an immediate payment of e1000 or
a larger delayed payment, the respective amounts being e1100, e1050, and
e1250.3
By analyzing studentsactual study e¤orts, we provide direct evidence
on the existence of a causal relationship between time preferences and aca-
demic performance. Establishing causality is challenging if not impossible,
as there is typically no exogenous variation in time preferences that can
be exploited. A promising alternative strategy is therefore to investigate
the channel underlying the relation between time preferences and academic
2A noteworthy exception is the evidence provided by Lavecchia et al. (2016) in their
survey of the literature on behavioral economics of education. An important di¤erence is
that they use self-reported data, whereas we use data from an electronic learning environ-
ment.
3Falk et al. (2016) show that non-incentivized survey measures of time preferences are
highly correlated with incentivized measures of time preferences.
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performance, namely whether and to what extent impatient students actu-
ally exert less e¤ort. This yields direct evidence on how time preferences
inuence study behavior, which is important as study outcomes may be
correlated with time preferences for other reasons than study e¤ort.
We nd little support for the hypothesis that impatient students actually
exert less e¤ort. We nd no statistically signicant di¤erences in the amount
of time students are logged in, the number of exercises generated, and in
summer course participation. Although the e¤ects are generally imprecisely
estimated, the point estimates are consistently close to zero. However, in
line with ndings of previous studies, we nd that impatience is associated
with weaker academic performance. Impatient individuals obtain lower nal
exam grades, and fail a nal exam more often. In particular, students who
always prefer the immediate payment are estimated to fail 34% more nal
exams than students of similar observed ability, amounting to 0.5 additional
failed nal exams per academic year. Taking into account that impatience
may also a¤ect performance via a reduction in the skills and knowledge
students possess at the start of the academic year, the cumulative e¤ect
of impatience may be as large as 55%. These e¤ects are mainly driven by
relatively able students, as measured by their score on an entry test.
The most plausible explanation for this paradoxical result is that impa-
tient students are of lower unmeasured ability. Consistent with this inter-
pretation, we nd that impatience is negatively correlated with measures
of ability. Although our measures of ability (score on an entry test and
prior education) arguably reect accumulated knowledge, several existing
studies also report negative correlations between impatience and measures
of intelligence that are closer to innate ability (Frederick, 2005, Shamosh
and Gray, 2008, Dohmen et al., 2010). An alternative explanation for this
paradox is that impatient students have a less e¤ective learning style, for
which we nd some indications in the data. In any case, our ndings sug-
gest that di¤erences in academic performance cannot simply be attributed
to di¤erences in e¤ort. Rather, they suggest that standard measures of im-
patience are associated with other, hard to observe factors that are relevant
for performance.
The negative association between impatience and nal exam results does
not carry over to measures of study progress. Correcting for ability, we do
not nd that impatient students obtain signicantly fewer study credits dur-
ing the rst year, nor are they less likely to fulll the universitys minimum
performance requirements. Although this nding goes against the hypothe-
sis that impatient students show weaker performance, it can easily be rec-
onciled with impatient time preferences: impatient students arguably nd
study delay more problematic. Moreover, their relatively good performance
on the resit exams is also consistent with their time preferences, as impatient
students may prefer postponing their study e¤ort to the resit exam.
Our ndings are well in line with the results of De Paola and Gioia
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(2013), who nd that impatience is reected in lower grades, but not in
higher dropout rates or fewer study credits. However, our results stand
in contrast to the results of Cadena and Keys (2015) and Golsteyn et al.
(2014), who nd that impatience is associated with important life-lasting
consequences, such as higher dropout rates and lower educational attain-
ment. Moreover, Cadena and Keys (2015) report substantial evidence for
dynamically inconsistent or impulsive behavior. Lavecchia et al. (2016) pro-
vide additional evidence by showing that impatient students report spending
less time on their homework. A likely reason for those diverging ndings is
that Cadena and Keys (2015), Lavecchia et al. (2016), and Golsteyn et al.
(2014) investigate representative samples of the general population, whereas
both De Paola and Gioia (2013) and we concentrate on university students.
Arguably, time preferences have more dramatic e¤ects on behavior in the
general population, as more intelligent individuals, like university students,
may have developed e¤ective ways to curb impulsive tendencies, or may be
better able to foresee the possible consequences of impatient behavior.4
Our paper also relates to a recent literature on procrastination and self-
control. De Paola and Scoppa (2015) show that students who procrastinate
completion of the university enrollment procedure have lower educational
achievement, and that remedial courses designed to improve basic learning
skills were particularly e¤ective for procrastinators. Duckworth et al. (2012)
emphasize the role of self-control in predicting the development of middle
school grades (see also Duckworth and Seligman, 2005, and the references
therein). Mo¢ t et al. (2011) show that self-control in childhood is associ-
ated with a wide array of important life outcomes, such as income, health,
and criminal convictions. A related strand of literature analyzes the demand
for commitment devices, and their e¤ectiveness in overcoming problems of
self-control.5 The di¤erence between those studies and ours is that they ex-
plicitly focus on self-control problems, whereas we investigate revealed time
preferences, possibly reecting self-control problems. Theoretically, there is
a clear and highly policy relevant distinction between time preferences and
self-control problems. Time preferences describe how individuals make in-
tertemporal trade-o¤s assuming rational decision making, while the concept
of self-control assumes that individuals sometimes fail to make the choices
they nd optimal from an ex-ante perspective. However, it is hard to distin-
guish between the two in practice, as revealed time preferences arguably also
4Alternatively, the distribution of time preferences may be much wider in the total
population. However, Andersen et al. (2010) compare time preferences in a sample of
university students with those in the general population, and nd that the distributions
do not di¤er that much.
5See, for example, Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002). There is also a recent literature
on the e¤ectiveness of nancial incentives in improving study behavior and outcomes.
See Lavecchia et al. (2016) for an overview. The idea is that nancial incentives o¤set
immediate costs of studying with immediate benets.
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reect impulsive tendencies.6 It is therefore not clear whether the e¤ects we
nd reect rational trade-o¤s or self-control problems.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we describe the background of our
study and the data used in the analysis. Then, in section 3, we present the
main analysis and results, including some robustness checks. In section 4,
we discuss possible interpretations of our results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data description
2.1 Background
Our sample consists of all rst-year students enrolled at the start of the aca-
demic year 2012-2013 at the School of Business and Economics of Maastricht
University. We collected data on their study behavior during an introduc-
tory course in quantitative methods, abbreviated as QM1. This course is
obligatory for all students who are enrolled at the School of Business and
Economics of Maastricht University and takes place the rst period of the
academic year.7 The course has a special place in the curriculum. Students
enrolled at the School of Business and Economics are required to obtain at
least 34 out of 60 course credits in their rst year, and in addition pass at
least one of the two courses in quantitative methods o¤ered in the rst year.
Students who fail to meet those criteria receive a so-called negative bind-
ing study advice(BSA), implying that they have to abandon their study
program, and are excluded from the study program for six years.8 Hence,
students face strong incentives to pass this course.
The course consists of 7 weeks of lectures and tutorials, followed by a
written exam. The aim of the course is to provide students with a basic
understanding of mathematics and statistics. Attendance of lectures is not
obligatory. Tutorials at Maastricht University are organized according to
the principles of problem-based learning, which involves intensive collabo-
ration in small groups of students to solve unstructured, often open-ended,
problems. Students are supposed to take the lead in discussing the problems,
while the teacher has a facilitating role.9 Tutorial groups are therefore small
6Burks et al. (2012), Dohmen et al. (2012), and Reuben et al. (2015) nd that
time preferences as measured by nancial decision making correlate with procrastinating
behavior. In fact, Dohmen et al. (2012) nd that elicited discount rates predict life
outcomes associated with self-control problems better than measures of time-inconsistent
preferences. On the other hand, Wölbert and Riedl (2013) nd that elicited discount rates
do not correlate with self-reported measures of impulsivity.
7The rst block consists of seven weeks of education, starting September 3, followed
by an exam October 27. The resit exam took place January 11.
8 In addition to this requirement, students have to pass all rst-year courses within two
years. All universities in the Netherlands have similar regulations, although the exact
performance requirements di¤er by university and faculty.
9See Wilkerson and Gijselaers (1996) for a detailed description.
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(at most 14 students), the tutor being either a sta¤ member or a teaching
assistant. Students are required to attend at least 7 out of 9 tutorials.
The exam consists of 40 multiple choice questions. Students who fail the
exam have the opportunity to retake the exam two months later, after the
Christmas holidays. Students who passed the nal exam are not allowed
to participate in the resit.10 Students had the opportunity to acquire a
bonus of at most 20% of the maximum score in the nal exam. This bonus
depends on their performance on three midterm tests, administered on the
computer, and the fraction of exercises completed in the electronic learning
environment. By completing more exercises, students partially compensate
for a less than perfect score on the midterm test. Final exam grades are
always expressed on a scale 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest), where 5.5 is the
minimum grade required to pass the exam. The nal passing rate in our
sample is 90%, and 75% of students pass after the rst attempt.
A special feature of this course is its use of an electronic learning environ-
ment, MyLab, which accompanies Pearsons textbooks in mathematics and
statistics.11 Students are supposed to use MyLab to practice the course ma-
terial and prepare for the midterm tests. Every week, students are supposed
to solve a set of problems related to the topics covered in that week. Each
topic is introduced by a test problem to assess existing skills and knowledge.
Students who master the material will solve the problem, and move on to the
next topic. Students who do not fully master the material may ask for assis-
tance that guides them to the correct solution ("help me solve this"), or for
a step-by-step worked example ("view an example"). Students will continue
receiving similar problems until they are able to solve them without the use
of the assistance tools. When they succeed, they automatically move on to
the next topic. Students who do not manage to solve the problem without
use of the electronic assistance tools may decide to move on to the next
topic manually. Students who completed all topics, but nevertheless feel
that they need additional practice, can restart a topic, in which case MyLab
provides new, similar exercises. A topic is considered completed when a stu-
dent manages to solve the problem without help of the electronic assistance
tools at least once. So, all students deal with the exact same topics, but
students di¤er in the number of exercises, and hence time needed, to com-
plete each topic, as well as the number of topics completed, and the number
10Ambitious students who care about obtaining a high grade may therefore strategically
not show up or deliberately fail the rst exam in order to take the resit exam. By doing so,
they have more time to prepare and hence obtain a higher nal grade. To the extent that
patient students are more prepared to do so, we underestimate the e¤ects of impatience
on rst exam performance. However, we do not nd that patient students obtain higher
grades in the resit.
11Pearson o¤ers MyLab applications in several disciplines. The course Quantitative
Methods 1 uses mathematics and statistics applications, named MyMathLab and MyS-
tatLab, respectively. See http://www.mymathlab.com and http://www.mystatlab.com
for further information.
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of additional exercises after a topic has been completed. MyLab records the
fraction of topics completed, the total number of exercises provided, and the
amount of time each student is logged in. The system automatically logs
o¤ after 30 minutes of inactivity. Furthermore, MyLab records how often
students ask for assistance in the form of guided solutions ("help me solve
this") and sample problems ("view an example"), which gives us insight
into di¤erences in learning style.12 MyLab is an important course tool, as
it provides a particularly good preparation for the midterm exams.
Other data were collected by means of a number of online questionnaires
during the course period. Those questionnaires were mainly concerned with
student motivation and learning styles.13 In the nal week of the course,
students had to complete an assignment in which they test whether their
own responses di¤er signicantly from the average response on a number of
these questionnairesitems. Filling out these questionnaires was therefore a
prerequisite to complete the assignment. As a result, all rst-year students
lled out these questionnaires. We measured risk and time preferences in
the questionnaire administered in week 6 of the course.
2.2 E¤ort
Our rst measure of e¤ort is the total amount of time a student is logged
in to the electronic learning environment, MyLab. The main advantage of
this measure is its objective and precise measurement. The median amount
of time spent in MyLab is about 8 hours per week. This is a substantial
part of studentstotal study time, as they are supposed to spend 20 hours
per week on this course, including obligatory attendance of 3 hours of tuto-
rials. A potential limitation is that a student does not need to be active in
MyLab during the time he is logged in: only after 30 minutes of inactivity
a student is automatically logged o¤. We therefore also use information on
the number of exercises generated by MyLab as a second measure of study
e¤ort. The two measures are highly related (pairwise correlation: 0.49),
suggesting that students who are logged in are generally active during that
time. The distribution of both e¤ort measures is depicted in Figures 1 and
2, respectively.
In order to get a complete picture, we also analyze the fraction of top-
ics completed in the electronic learning environment. As explained above,
12MyLab does not record all requests for sample problems, but only for the nal attempt
in a given topic. This makes the interpretation problematic: the more a student of a given
ability practices, the less likely he is to request a sample problem in his nal attempt.
All requests for guided solutions, however, are recorded. For 29 students information on
assistance requests was lost because their accounts were incidentally reused in later years.
13Students were informed that these data would remain condential, and used in anony-
mous format for research purposes as well as improvement of QM1 education. Research
using similar data from previous cohorts is described in Tempelaar et al. (2012, 2013a,
2013b).
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MyLab does not only record the amount of time spent, but also keeps track
of the fraction of problems the student manages to solve without electronic
assistance. This gives us some idea about whether students understood the
course material.14 Completing all topics is a matter of e¤ort and ability. Be-
cause students can innitely practice and ask for assistance, it is not hard to
complete all or almost all topics. Specically, 24% of students complete all
topics, and about half of our sample completes at least 98% of all topics.15
Figure A3 in the appendix shows the full distribution.
An inherent limitation of e¤ort measures derived from the electronic
learning environment is that we do not observe study e¤orts outside My-
Lab, for instance studying written course material or attending lectures.
This is a problem to the extent that impatient students are more likely to
study MyLab than written course materials, or to attend lectures.16 This
concern seems less relevant for our nal measure of e¤ort: participation in
an online summer course that takes place each year during the three months
preceding the start of the academic year. The university o¤ers this course
in response to increasing numbers of students that start their studies with
a deciency in mathematics. The course is advertised on the web page de-
scribing the economics and business study programs, and on a web page that
o¤ers practical information for prospective rst-year students. Moreover, all
students who receive their proof of admission are informed about the course
by email. Participation is voluntary, but recommended for students who
were on a high school track involving little mathematics, which is about
2/3 of our sample. Students can take a 10-15 minutes online entry test to
identify deciencies in their mathematical skills. The course takes about 80
hours of study, depending on pre-existing knowledge, and is entirely online.
In 2012, costs of participating were e50.
14As MyLab records this information separately by problem set and subject (math and
statistics), we sum the scores (i.e. the fraction of topics completed) obtained over the 7
weeks and rescale them to a 0-100% scale. This procedure is preferable to calculating the
unweighted fraction of completed topics, i.e. dividing the sum of completed topics by the
total number of topics. The reason is that the number and di¢ culty level of exercises
di¤ers by week and subject. Our procedure ensures that weeks with few, but di¢ cult
exercises get a higher weight.
15Many students complete most, but not all topics. The reason is that there are topics
that require completing exercises that consist of several subquestions. A topic is only
counted as completed when all subquestions are correctly solved without help of the elec-
tronic assistance tools. If one of the subquestions is incorrectly answered, students need
to go through the whole exercise again to complete the topic, i.e. solving a similar exer-
cise consisting of a number of subquestions. Many students are not willing to do so, and
therefore fail to complete one or a few exercises.
16As a robustness check, our questionnaire in week 6 asked students to indicate the
average total number of hours spent on the course QM1 each week. As self-reported
measures may su¤er from potentially important biases, we do not present results using
this measure. Results are qualitatively similar when we use this measure.
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2.3 Performance measures
We collected information on studentsperformance in the course QM1, as
well as information on performance in all other rst-year courses. In the
case of QM1, we investigate two measures of performance: the nal exam
grade, and whether a student passed or failed the nal exam. The grade
distribution is shown in Figure A4 in the appendix, where grades below 5.5
are insu¢ cient to pass the exam. We do not consider results obtained on
the resit exam, as it is cleaner to focus on the results obtained on the nal
exam: all students take the exact same test and have the same opportunities
to prepare. Also, we do not have information on study e¤orts for the resit
exam.
For all other rst-year courses, we have four measures of performance. In
analogy with our performance measures in the course QM1, we investigate
the grade point average (GPA), weighted by the number of study credits, of
all nal exams, as well as the number of nal exams failed over the course
of the rst year. In both measures, we exclude results obtained on the re-
sit. Further, we investigate the number of course credits (ECTS) obtained,
and whether a student receives a negative binding study advice (BSA), i.e.
drops out as a result of failing to meet the performance requirements ex-
plained above. The respective distributions are shown in Figures A5-A7
in the appendix, and descriptive statistics are provided in Table 2.17 We
expect a negative relation between impatience and all of those performance
measures, but we also expect some di¤erences. Intuitively, we might expect
that impatient students are willing to accept a higher risk of failing an exam,
but that they are much less willing to do so if failing will lead to a negative
binding study advice (BSA) or study delay (ECTS).
2.4 Time preferences
Data on time and risk preferences were collected by means of the online
questionnaire that was administered in week 6 of the course.18 Specically,
time preferences were measured with the following hypothetical question:
Suppose someone you fully trust o¤ers you a gift of e1000 today. How-
ever, he tells you that you can wait for one year and receive e1100 instead.
Which would you prefer?
a) e1000 now
b) e1100 in a year from now
This question was repeated two times, where the postponed amount was
subsequently changed to e1050 and e1250. The idea behind those questions
is that most individuals prefer the immediate payment when the delayed
17As can be seen from Table 2, 16% of the sample receives a negative BSA.
18As students did not take a nal exam yet, we can rule out that their exam performance
a¤ects their revealed preferences.
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payment is low, but switch to the delayed payment when the latter amount
is high enough. The amount for which individuals switch to the delayed
payment is our measure of impatience. Hence, we can distinguish between
individuals who always prefer the delayed payment (most patient), those
who switch when the amount is e1100 or e1250, and those who always
prefer the immediate payment (most impatient). Out of the 882 students
who lled out our questionnaire, 20 students did not answer this question,
while 7 individuals provided inconsistent answers, and are therefore dropped
from the analysis.19 We decided to use hypothetical payo¤s rather than
real monetary payo¤s, because even with a sizeable budget the expected
amount at stake would be limited to only a couple of euros. We do not think
that when the stakes are so low, introducing real monetary payo¤s would
lead to more accurate measurement of preferences for present over future
consumption, as consumption at any point in time will not be inuenced by
such low amounts. Falk et al. (2016) show that non-incentivized measures
of patience strongly correlate with incentivized measures obtained in the lab
(see Dohmen et al., 2013, for a similar result on a self-assessed measure of
impatience).20 A more important limitation of this measure is that it might
be confounded by, for instance, mathematical ability. More able individuals
might be better able to calculate implied discount rates, and may realize
that they can earn an above-market rate for all delayed payments. This will
make more intelligent individuals appear as relatively patient. Important
advantages of this measure are that similar measures have been used by
closely related papers (Kirby et al., 2005, De Paola and Gioia, 2013, and
Golsteyn et al., 2014), which facilitates the comparison with their results,
and that they have been shown to correlate with several real-life behaviors
(see in addition to the papers mentioned in the introduction, Dohmen et al.,
2012).21 Moreover, it is conceptually clear what it measures: the question
is well dened, which is less clear for subjective measures.
2.5 Ability/prior education
It is important to correct for intelligence and, relatedly, accumulated skills
and knowledge, as both are potentially correlated with time preferences
19Answers are considered as inconsistent when an individual prefers the postponed pay-
ment when this amount is relatively low, while preferring the immediate payment when
the postponed payment is even larger.
20 Incentivizing the measurement of time preferences is common in lab experiments (e.g.
Kirby et al., 2005; Dohmen et al., 2010; Castillo et al., 2011; Sutter et al., 2013), but
uncommon in surveys (e.g. Cadena and Keys, 2015; De Paola and Gioia, 2013; Golsteyn
et al., 2014).
21Empirical results for measures of time inconsistency, i.e. declining or increasing dis-
count rates revealed when the time horizon is varied, are more mixed (Dohmen et al.
2012). We therefore decided to concentrate on the discount rate as a measure of time
preferences, and take an agnostic stance on whether this reects time inconsistency or a
fully rational trade-o¤.
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and study behavior. As mentioned in the introduction, a consistent nding
in the literature is that time preferences are related to measures of innate
intelligence.22 Likewise, when impatient students spend less time on their
studies in secondary education, they can be expected to enter university
with less skills and knowledge, which sets them behind in the course QM1.
For those two reasons, it is natural to assume a negative relation between
impatience and measures of ability. To the extent that measures of ability
reect accumulated skills and knowledge rather than innate intelligence,
correcting for ability allows us distinguish between the contemporaneous
e¤ect of impatience and its cumulative e¤ect. We employ two measures of
ability. The rst is the score on an entry test that took place the rst week
of the course. The test aimed to assess existing skills and knowledge and
consisted of 21 multiple choice questions: 14 questions on mathematics and
7 on statistics. From the performance on this entry test, we construct two
measures, one equaling the number of correct answers in the mathematics
part, the other one equaling the number of correct answers in the statistics
part. The reason for keeping the two parts separate is that they measure
di¤erent things. The rst measure captures mathematical ability, which can
be expected to be correlated with measures of IQ. The second measures
statistical knowledge, which is less suitable as a proxy for IQ, but rather
reects di¤erences in high school education.23
The second measure of ability is a dummy which takes value 1 if an
individual followed an advanced mathematics track in high school.24 Apart
from prior education, this variable may also proxy for intelligence, as more
intelligent individuals are more likely to choose a mathematics major in high
school.
2.6 Control variables
In our analyses, we control for risk preferences, as risk preferences may be
related to time preferences (Anderhub et al., 2001; Dohmen et al., 2010;
Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012; and Sutter et al., 2013). Our measure of
risk preferences is taken from the German Socio-Economic Panel and asks
22The distinction between innate intelligence and accumulated skills and knowledge
is not clear-cut, as measures of intelligence such as standard IQ tests may also reect
cumulated skills and knowledge. However, they arguably do so to a lesser extent than,
say, SAT tests (Dohmen et al. 2010).
23This is apparent from the fact that the score on the statistics part is hardly related
to our performance measures, while it is negatively correlated with time spent in MyLab
(r=0.18). As Table 1 shows, the score on the mathematics part is strongly positively
related to performance measures.
24A mathematical level is classied as advanced when it is the highest or one of the
highest mathematical high-school levels o¤ered in the country, i.e. wiskunde-bin case of
the Netherlands, Leistungskursin case of Germany, international baccalaureate math
higher level in case a student followed an international baccalaureate program, or self-
identied by students as a high school math track in all other cases.
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for individuals stated willingness to take risks in general. It is measured
on a 7-point scale, where 1 means highly risk averse and 7 fully prepared
to take risks. Dohmen et al. (2011) and Vieider et al. (2015) show that
this measure predicts actual behavior in incentivized lottery experiments,
that it is correlated with risky behaviors in several domains, and that it is
stable across cultures. Therefore, despite its subjective nature, this seems
an adequate measure of risk preferences in our setting.
The questionnaire we administered in week 6 asked students to give their
best estimate of their expected exam grade for this course. This question
was incentivized as follows. Students whose estimated grade was within
0.25 points of their actual exam grade participated in a lottery, in which
two winners were randomly drawn. Both winners received a book voucher
worth 20 euros. We use this information to capture dimensions of ability
and e¤ort that are not included in our other measures of e¤ort and ability.
Maastricht University attracts sizeable numbers of foreign students, partly
because of its location close to the Belgian and German border, but also be-
cause of the language of instruction (English), and its distinct educational
philosophy. In our analyses, we include dummies for the most prevalent
nationalities to capture cultural di¤erences and di¤erences in educational
systems.25 Throughout, we also include dummies for the study program:
Economics, Fiscal Economics, or International Business. Moreover, we col-
lected measures for anxiety, persistence, and self-belief. Those measures are
all constructed from the Student Motivation Scale (Martin, 2009).26 Finally,
for the course in quantitative methods we have information on the tutorial
group each student belongs to, as well as on the identity of each groups
tutor. When possible, we include an indicator variable on whether the tutor
was a sta¤ member (typically a PhD student) or a teaching assistant.
2.7 Descriptive statistics
Our nal sample combines two datasets: students who lled out the ques-
tionnaire (882 obs.) and students who were recorded in the electronic learn-
ing environment (887 obs.). Virtually all rst-year students occur in at least
25We measure nationality rather than the country in which the student obtained his or
her high school diploma. However, we observe that very few students obtain a diploma
abroad. For instance, despite Maastricht being close to the Belgian and German border,
none of the 43 Belgian students and only 1 out of 427 German students obtained a Dutch
high school diploma. In fact, just two of the 172 students with a Dutch high school diploma
in our sample do not have the Dutch nationality. Conversely, just 3 students with Dutch
nationality obtained a German diploma.
26Each concept was measured by four items. Examples of these items are: "When exams
and assignments are coming up, I worry a lot" (anxiety); "If an assignment is di¢ cult, I
keep working at it trying to gure it out" (persistence); "If I try hard, I believe I can do
my university work well" (self-belief). See Martin (2009) for details.
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one of the two datasets, and 860 students occur in both datasets.27 We ex-
clude 12 students for whom the e-learning environment recorded more than
30 practice hours of mathematics or statistics in at least one of the weeks,
which is probably a recording error. We also eliminate 27 individuals who
did not provide a valid answer (i.e. an inconsistent answer or no answer
at all, see above) to our questions measuring time preferences. Finally, we
exclude 2 repeat students from the sample.28 This leaves us with a sam-
ple of 819 observations. However, since not all students gave complete and
consistent answers to all questions, the nal number of observations in the
analysis is limited to at most 794.
Table 1 shows the pairwise correlations between the most important
variables. This provides valuable information about the quality of our mea-
sures of study e¤ort. The rst thing to note is that our measures of e¤ort
are signicantly positively correlated. In particular, as noted above, time
logged in to MyLab is highly related with the number of exercises generated
(r=0.49), suggesting students are generally active when they are logged in.
Time logged in is also strongly correlated with the percentage of topics com-
pleted (r=0.51). This is in line with the idea that solving the exercises is
primarily a matter of e¤ort, but ability also plays a role. The correlation of
the percentage of topics completed with the entry test score on mathematics
is non-negligible (r=0.19). Participation in the summer course is also posi-
tively related to time spent in MyLab (r=0.20) and the number of exercises
generated (r=0.13). The second thing to note is that our e¤ort measures
are not related to performance in the course QM1. This, however, is due
to the fact that pairwise correlations do not take non-linearities and ability
di¤erences into account.
A number of other relevant observations can be made from Table 1.
First, impatience (included as a categorical variable that takes values from
0 to 3) is signicantly negatively correlated with most measures of perfor-
mance (ECTS and BSA being the exceptions), but not with any of the
e¤ort measures. As we will see, this largely corresponds to the ndings in
the regression analyses described in section 3. Second, in line with existing
studies, students who perform better on the mathematics entry test are less
impatient (r= 0.14). Interestingly, the grade in the course QM1 is highly
predictive for grades in other courses (r=0.70) and academic performance in
2727 students registered in MyLab did not ll out the questionnaire. Of those students,
60% quit their studies in the rst period, and only 3 meet the BSA requirements. So,
roughly speaking, our sample includes all rst year students, except those who realize
after the rst few weeks that the content of the study program does not meet their initial
expectations.
28For nancial reasons, the majority of repeat students do not have an individual license
for MyLab. Hence, only two repeat students are recorded in the electronic learning envi-
ronment. We veried that our results are robust to the inclusion of students who do not
appear in the electronic learning environment data, conservatively assuming that these
individuals exerted zero e¤ort. Results are available upon request.
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general. It is therefore safe to assume that the relation between impatience
and actual study e¤ort in the course QM1 carries over to other courses.
Figure A1 in the appendix shows the distribution of the answers to the
time discounting question. Figure A2 shows the distribution of the math
entry test scores, which is somewhat atter than the normal distribution,
but nicely symmetric. Figures 1, 2, and A3-A9 in the appendix display the
distributions of the continuous dependent variables used in the analyses,
while Table 2 provides information on the binary variables (result of nal
exam in QM1 and participation in the summer course). About 75% of the
sample passes the nal exam QM1, and 20% participates in the summer
course.
3 Results
3.1 Study e¤orts
In this section, we test the hypothesis that impatient individuals actually
exert less study e¤ort. As described above, we have two closely related
e¤ort measures based on the electronic learning environment: recorded time
logged in to MyLab and the number of exercises generated by MyLab. We
complement these measures with the percentage of topics completed in order
to get an idea about di¤erences in understanding of the course material.
Finally, we investigate participation in the online summer course.
3.1.1 Time logged in to MyLab and number of exercises gener-
ated
We use quantile regressions to estimate the relation between time logged
in to MyLab and impatience. The reason is that the distribution of the
dependent variable is right-skewed, as shown by Figure 1. Using quantile
regression instead of OLS makes the results more robust to outliers.29 In
all analyses, we use dummy variables to estimate the e¤ect of time pref-
erences. We distinguish between three patience categories, based on indi-
vidualsswitchpoint in the time discounting question. The base category is
formed by relatively patient individuals, namely individuals who always pre-
fer the delayed payment and individuals who switch to the delayed payment
when the amount is e1100. The reason for combining the two relatively
patient categories into one category is to obtain a more precise estimation
of the e¤ect of the two most impatient categories.30 We use dummies be-
29 In all quantile regressions, we use the median as quantile of interest. Results are
robust for using other quantiles. Likewise, results are similar when we use OLS or when
we transform the dependent variable, specically by taking logs or an indicator variable
for spending an above-median number of hours.
30As it turns out, the estimated coe¢ cients of the two most patient categories are
typically similar, and never di¤er signicantly from each other. By combining those into
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cause we do not know individualsexact discount rate, but only the upper
and/or lower bound. Moreover, the e¤ect of individualsdiscount rate on
the dependent variable need not be linear.
Table 3 reports the estimation results. In the rst column, we estimate
our basic specication, correcting for gender, age, nationality, study pro-
gram, and whether the tutor is a sta¤ member or teaching assistant. We
observe no di¤erences between individuals with di¤erent switchpoints that
are statistically signicant at the 5% level. The point estimates are very
small, given that the median number of hours logged in to MyLab is 55
hours, but the e¤ects are rather imprecisely estimated. For instance, the
95% condence interval for the most impatient category of individuals runs
from -5.2 to 5.2, meaning that we can roughly rule out e¤ect sizes of more
than 10%, but that we cannot rule out the existence of small but mean-
ingful di¤erences. In the second column of Table 3, we control for ability
by including a dummy for having obtained a mathematics major in high
school and entry test scores. We use a exible specication: we distinguish
6 categories of math entry test scores, and 7 categories of statistics entry
test scores. However, controlling for ability does not a¤ect the estimated
e¤ect of impatience on the time logged in to MyLab. It is worth noting that
our ability measures are hardly related to time logged in to MyLab. Ap-
parently, more talented students do not rest on their laurels, but rather aim
for higher grades. In the third column of Table 3, we additionally control
for risk attitude and personality characteristics such as anxiety, persistence,
and self-belief. Again, this has no discernible e¤ect on the estimated e¤ect of
time preferences.31 In column 4 of Table 3, we add participation in the sum-
mer course to the regression, capturing a mixture of ability, motivation, and
prior knowledge, but this does not a¤ect the qualitative results. So, we nd
no statistically signicant relationship between time preferences and time
logged in to MyLab. Although we cannot rule the existence of meaningful
di¤erences, the point estimates are consistently close to zero.
As discussed above, a highly related measure of study e¤ort is the num-
ber of exercises generated by MyLab. In Table 4, we report estimations
using the number of exercises generated by MyLab as the measure of study
e¤ort. The results are very similar, in the sense that we do not nd statis-
tically signicant di¤erences. Also, the point estimates go in the opposite
direction as expected, which makes it very unlikely that the true e¤ect is
actually negative (e¤ects smaller than -4% of the median are outside the
95% condence interval). This suggests that our nding is not simply due
to impatient students spending more time on other activities while being
one reference category, the coe¢ cients of the other categories are more precisely estimated.
31One might be concerned that persistence captures self-control problems, and might
therefore be strongly related to time preferences. It turns out that this is not the case,
however. The pairwise correlation between both variables is virtually zero, and there is
no relation controlling for ability and demographics.
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logged in.32
3.1.2 Score on problems solved
Next, we assess the relation between impatience and the percentage of topics
completed in MyLab. As 24% of the students manage to complete all topics,
we distinguish between students who complete all topics and those who
fail to do so. Table 5 reports the estimated mean marginal e¤ects of a
probit model, where the dependent variable is 1 for students who complete
all topics. The independent variables are the same as in Tables 3 and 4.
As can be seen from column 3 in Table 5, the most impatient category
of students is estimated to be 9 percentage points less likely to complete
all topics than the reference category, even after correcting for ability, risk
attitude, and personality. This e¤ect is statistically signicant at the 5%
level. This suggests that impatient students have a lower understanding of
the course material, although we do not nd clear evidence that they spend
fewer hours. This point is illustrated by the results reported in column
4 of Table 5. We additionally correct for e¤ort by including participation
in the summer course, the time logged in to MyLab, and the number of
exercises generated. Specically, we include a dummy for each quintile of the
distribution of time logged in and number of exercises generated. We might
expect that impatience is no longer relevant after inclusion of those variables.
However, this is not the case: the estimated coe¢ cients for impatience are
hardly a¤ected. Therefore, it seems that di¤erences in understanding of
the course material are not driven by di¤erences in study e¤ort. We obtain
similar results when we replace the dependent variable with an indicator that
distinguishes between students with an above- and below-median score. It
should be noted, however, that when we constrain the analysis to individuals
who obtain a below-median score, there is no statistically signicant relation
between time preferences and the percentage of topics completed. A possible
interpretation is that these students have such a lack of motivation that time
preferences play no role, as they exert only minimum e¤ort anyway.33
32We check the robustness of our results by excluding a number of outliers. Unreported
regressions show that we obtain similar results when we exclude students who were logged
in for more than 100 or 80 hours in total, and when we exclude students who attempted
more than 1500 or 1000 exercises.
33Students with a below-median score (98%) are logged in on average 51 hours during
the period, while students with an above-median score spend on average 66 hours in
MyLab. Although some students with a below-median score may simply lack the ability
to obtain a high score, this suggests that a substantial number of those students also lack
the motivation to complete almost all topics.
16
3.1.3 Participation in summer course
Finally, we investigate how time preferences relate to participation in the
online summer course. Table 6 presents the results of estimating a probit
model, where the dependent variable equals 1 when a student participated in
the summer course. The rst two columns show estimates on the full sample.
We observe no statistically signicant di¤erences between impatient students
and the reference category. The estimated coe¢ cients are essentially zero,
although the standard errors around these estimates are substantial.
One might argue that the relationship is stronger for students with a
weak background in mathematics. Theoretically, students weigh the costs
and future benets of participating in the summer course. One might expect
that students with a better high school education in mathematics perceive
both the benets and the e¤ort costs as lower. As individual di¤erences in
time discount rates play a larger role when future benets are high, we might
expect a stronger relation when we restrict the sample to students with a
weak background in mathematics. In columns 3 and 4 of Table 6, we restrict
the sample to students who were on a high school track in which mathematics
was a major or a minor subject, respectively. Contrary to our expectations,
we nd no relation in the sample of students with a weak background in
mathematics. In fact, we nd more evidence for a relation among students
who majored in mathematics. However, we should not overinterpret this
nding, as only 37 students with a major in mathematics participate in the
summer course.
3.2 Performance
In this section, we rst investigate the relation between impatience and
performance in the course QM1, where performance is measured by nal
exam grades and the probability of failing the nal exam. The analysis of
performance in the course QM1 is of particular interest, as we analyze the
relation between impatience and study e¤ort in the context of the course
QM1. Then, we analyze other measures of academic performance in the
rst year in order to see whether performance di¤erences extend to rst-
year performance more generally.
3.2.1 Performance on the nal exam in QM1
Table 7 reports the results of a Tobit estimation of individualsnal exam
grade in QM1 as a function of their discount rates. As a signicant fraction of
students obtain the highest possible grade (see Figure A4 in the appendix),
we use a Tobit model to account for the right-censoring of the data.34 The
34We obtain similar results (available upon request) when we use OLS or median regres-
sions. Six students did not show up for the rst exam QM1, and are treated as missing.
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rst column of Table 7 shows that the most impatient category of individuals
obtains a signicantly lower grade than the reference category, correcting
for gender, age, nationality, study program, and whether the tutor is a sta¤
member or teaching assistant. The e¤ect is not only statistically signicant,
but also meaningful in economic terms: the di¤erence is about 1.2 points
on a 10-point scale. The di¤erence between the reference category and the
category of individuals who switches when the delayed payment is e1250 is
much smaller, and statistically signicant only at the 10% level. This e¤ect
becomes insignicant once we add controls.
In the second column of Table 7, we control for students ability by
adding dummies for their score on the entry tests, as well as a dummy
for having majored in mathematics in high school. Those measures reect
innate intelligence as well as accumulated skills and knowledge, and are
therefore likely to be endogenous with respect to time preferences. This is
important for the interpretation of the results: the estimates reported above
can be seen as an upper bound on the cumulative e¤ect of time preferences
on performance.35 Correcting for ability gives us the contemporaneous ef-
fect. In line with existing studies (Cadena and Keys, 2015; De Paola and
Gioa, 2013; Golsteyn et al., 2014), the estimated coe¢ cient decreases in ab-
solute magnitude when controlling for ability as revealed at the start of the
academic year, but remains sizeable and statistically signicant. The e¤ect
size is about one quarter of a standard deviation. Next, we add controls for
risk attitude and measures of personality. This, however, has only a minor
impact on the estimated e¤ect of time preferences.
The key question is whether di¤erences in impatient students grades
can be attributed to di¤erences in study e¤ort. We have already seen that
there is no relation between time preferences and time logged in to MyLab,
the number of exercises generated by MyLab, and participation in the sum-
mer course. Column 4 of Table 7 reports estimations controlling for those
variables. Specically, we include a dummy for each quintile of the distri-
bution of time spent and number of exercises generated.36 The estimation
results conrm that di¤erences in performance are not driven by di¤erences
in e¤ort as measured by activity in MyLab and participation in the summer
course. In column 5, we additionally control for the percentage of topics
completed. We use a non-linear specication by including dummies for 5
categories.37 Their inclusion clearly reduces the negative e¤ect of impa-
tience on performance, but the estimated coe¢ cient for the most impatient
category remains sizeable and statistically signicant at the 5% level. In
35 It is an upper bound, because we do not know to what extent our ability measures
reect prior investments or innate intelligence.
36The results are very similar when we estimate models that allow for interactions
between our measures of e¤ort and entry test scores. Results are available upon request.
37The ve categories do not perfectly correspond to the quintiles of the distribution, as
24% of the sample obtains the highest possible score.
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column 6, we further control for e¤ort and ability by including individuals
grade expectations. Again, this leads to a drop in the estimated e¤ect of
impatience, and the e¤ect is only statistically signicant at the 10% level.
So, by extensively controlling for e¤ort and ability, we can largely explain
the negative e¤ect of impatience on the nal exam grade in QM1. However,
the di¤erences in performance cannot simply be explained by di¤erences in
activity in MyLab or understanding of the course material as revealed by
the fraction of topics completed.
Arguably, the relation between patience and grades is stronger than the
relation between patience and passing or failing the exam, as the benets
of obtaining a higher grade materialize in the remote future, while failing
the exam has more immediate consequences. Table 8 presents the results
of estimating a probit model, where the dependent variable takes the value
1 if a student failed the nal exam in QM1, and 0 otherwise. Coe¢ cients
report mean marginal e¤ects. Column 1 shows that individuals who always
prefer the immediate payment have a 16 percentage point higher estimated
probability of failing the exam than the reference category, correcting for
the usual demographics. This e¤ect is substantial, as only 25% of our sam-
ple fails the rst exam in QM1. The point estimates become smaller and
statistically insignicant when we add controls for ability, risk attitude, and
other personality characteristics (columns 2-3). The estimated e¤ect of im-
patience is close to zero when correcting for study e¤ort (columns 4 and
5) and expected exam grade (column 6). So, although impatient students
obtain a lower grade for the nal exam in QM1, we nd no evidence for
a contemporaneous e¤ect of impatience on the probability of passing the
exam.
3.2.2 Performance in other courses
An important question is to what extent the relation between patience and
study results in the course QM1 is representative of other courses. To an-
swer this question, we examine the relation between patience and academic
performance in rst-year courses other than QM1. Our rst measure of
performance is the GPA, i.e. the ECTS-weighted average of the nal exam
grades obtained in all rst-year courses except QM1. We only consider nal
exam grades obtained on the rst attempt and exclude results obtained on
the resit.38 We estimate the model using OLS, since the distribution of the
GPA is not censored, as shown by Figure A5 in the appendix.
Table 9 shows the results of regressing the GPA on time preferences
and the same set of controls as before (except for whether tutors are sta¤
members or teaching assistants). The rst thing to note is that, in almost
38Results are similar when we investigate average nal grades, i.e. including the resit
results in the average. This is unsurprising, given that the correlation between the average
grade based on rst sit and nal grades is 0.98.
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all specications, the most impatient category of individuals obtains signif-
icantly lower grades than individuals who are more patient. In fact, the
relation between patience and the GPA is virtually the same as the relation
between patience and the grade obtained in the course QM1. The estimated
e¤ect sizes are similar after standardizing: correcting for ability, risk atti-
tude, and personality, the expected grade of the most impatient students is
about one quarter of a standard deviation lower than the expected grade
of the reference category. In this sense, the relation between patience and
grades we observe in the context of QM1 seems highly representative of other
rst-year courses.
The second thing to note is that although our measures of ability and
e¤ort are obtained in the specic context of QM1, they are strongly related
to the average grade obtained in other courses. The measures of ability
jointly add substantial explanatory power, as shown by the di¤erence in R2
between columns 1 and 2. Nevertheless, the relation between impatience
and grades becomes insignicant only when we add the full set of controls
for ability and e¤ort (column 6).
Next, we assess whether impatient studentslower GPA also translates
into a higher probability of failing an exam. Specically, we count the num-
ber of courses (other than QM1) in which a student failed the nal exam,
conditional on participating in that exam. Not participating in a courses
nal exam is not considered as a failed exam, since we do not know the grade
the student would have obtained if he had participated.39 We estimate a
negative binomial count model that corrects for exposure to the number of
nal exams taken. The estimation results, presented in the rst two columns
of Table 10, are comparable to the results on GPA: students who belong to
the most impatient category fail more nal exams. The e¤ect is sizeable:
the most impatient category fails e0:55 = 44% more exams than the refer-
ence category. This e¤ect partially reects impatient studentslower ability
at the start of the academic year. To the extent that our ability measures
reect lower prior investments (rather than innate ability), this e¤ect can be
viewed as the cumulative e¤ect of impatience. When we include our controls
for ability, impatient students are estimated to fail about e0:29 = 34% more
exams than the reference category, which amounts to almost 0.5 additional
failed exam per academic year. Thus, the most impatient individuals do not
only obtain lower grades on the nal exams, they are also more likely to fail
these exams. The course QM1 seems to be the exception in this respect,
39Clearly, students who do not show up at the exam may do so for a specic reason.
For instance, students may stay at home because they expect to fail anyway, or because
their strategy is to take the resit exam later in the year, as the additional time allows for
a better preparation. We therefore checked whether participation in a courses nal exam
is related to impatience, and do not nd a statistically signicant relation between the
two. We also redid our analysis assuming that students who did not participate, failed
the exam. This does not a¤ect the qualitative results.
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arguably because the stakes are higher than for other courses, since the BSA
criteria require passing at least one of the courses in quantitative methods.40
An important question from the perspective of social welfare is whether
impatient students earn fewer ECTS in the rst year. This is not implied by
lower performance on the nal exams: impatient students may perform rel-
atively well on the re-examinations, and consequently earn a similar number
of ECTS as less impatient students. As the distribution of ECTS is naturally
bounded between 0 and 60 ECTS, with the majority (53%) of students ob-
taining the highest possible number of ECTS and a negligible (2%) number
obtaining zero ECTS, we rst estimate a probit model where the dependent
variable equals 1 when a student passes all courses, and 0 otherwise. The
results are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 10. The most impatient
category of students has a 13.5 percentage point smaller chance of passing
all rst-year courses than the reference category (column 3). This is a sub-
stantial e¤ect, given that 53% of the sample obtains 60 ECTS. When we
control for ability, risk attitude, and personality, the estimated coe¢ cient
reduces to 7 percentage points, as can be seen in column 4 of Table 10. The
coe¢ cient is also no longer statistically signicant (p=0.16), but it should
be noted that the standard errors are too large to detect even substantial
e¤ect sizes (below 10 percentage points). The e¤ect seems restricted to the
extensive margin (i.e. obtaining all ECTS or not). When we estimate an
OLS regression on the sample of students who do not obtain all ECTS, we
do not nd any relation between impatience and the number of ECTS ob-
tained, as shown in column 5 of Table 10. The point estimates are close
to zero and go in the opposite direction as we would expect. Unreported
regressions show that this result continues to hold when we do not control
for ability, when we exclude students with particularly bad performance in
terms of the number of ECTS obtained (using various thresholds), and when
we exclude students who fail to meet the BSA requirements. Also, we do
not nd a statistically signicant relationship when we combine the intensive
and extensive margins by estimating a count model.41 So, although the most
impatient category of students unambiguously shows worse performance on
nal exams than more patient students, this is not clearly reected in a
lower number of ECTS.
40Consistent with this argument, we observe a similar pattern in the course QM2: im-
patient students obtain lower grades, but do not fail more often. We analyze this in more
detail by exploiting the fact that when taking the course QM2, some of the students have
passed the course QM1, while others failed and consequently have to pass QM2 to meet
the BSA criteria. Thus, if the stakes are key, we would expect that impatience has a
negative e¤ect on the probability of passing the exam in QM2 for students who already
passed QM1, but not for those who failed QM1. We dont nd this pattern. The evidence
is therefore inconclusive.
41We also nd no di¤erences between high and low ability students, as measured by their
math entry test score. More generally, we will analyze the interaction between impatience
and ability in more detail in subsection 3.3.
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In columns 6 and 7 of Table 10, we analyze the relation between receiv-
ing a negative BSA and impatience. We estimate a probit model where the
dependent variable equals 1 if a student received a negative BSA, and 0
otherwise. We nd no indication that impatient students are more likely to
receive a negative BSA than more patient students. In fact, the estimated
coe¢ cients on the impatience dummies are small relative to the percentage
of students who receive a negative BSA (16% of the sample), and typically
go in the opposite direction from that predicted by theory. So, although
highly impatient individuals show generally weaker academic performance,
this remains without severe negative consequences by the end of the rst
year.42 This result is particularly remarkable in light of the fact that im-
patient students demonstrate lower skills and knowledge when they enter
university.
These ndings suggest that impatient students tend to shift their study
e¤orts to the resit exams. Although impatient students do not exert less
e¤ort for the rst exam, their relatively weak performance suggests that
they should have exerted more e¤ort to obtain the same grade or to pass
the course. As they are more likely to pass on the resit, they apparently do
so when preparing for the resit exam.43 This behavior is perfectly consistent
with their time preferences, for two reasons. First, it is optimal to postpone
the study e¤ort required to pass the course, as expected future study e¤orts
are more heavily discounted. Second, impatient students may perceive study
delay as more problematic, which increases their incentives to pass the resit
exam.
3.3 Estimation by ability
In this section, we analyze how the relation between time preferences, aca-
demic performance, and study e¤ort depends on ability. From a theoretical
perspective, there is an ambiguous relation between ability and the e¤ect
of impatience on study behavior. On the one hand, one could argue that
impatience is less relevant for students of low ability, because they exert
maximum e¤ort anyway. On the other hand, one could argue that impa-
tience is less relevant for students of high ability. Since high-ability students
may perceive the marginal benets of e¤ort as low (they are sure to pass
the exam anyway), a change in impatience has little e¤ect.44 One could
42This result also holds when we exclude 31 students who drop out before Christmas.
One could argue that those students never seriously attempted to meet the BSA criteria, as
they apparently realized after a few months of study that they made a suboptimal study
choice. Results excluding this group of students are described in Non and Tempelaar
(2015).
43 In line with this interpretation, we nd that impatient individuals are more likely to
pass, but do not generally obtain higher grades on resit exams.
44Suppose students choose e¤ort to maximize the following utility function:
u = f(e; a)  c(e);
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also argue that the future marginal benets of e¤ort are much larger for
high-ability students, and that a change in valuation of the future therefore
has a large e¤ect. So, from a theoretical perspective, the relation between
time preferences, academic performance, and study e¤ort may be di¤erent
for students of di¤erent ability. To examine this, we split the sample into a
low-, medium-, and high-ability group, based on the scores on the mathe-
matics entry test. Students with a score above 8 are classied as high-ability
students, while students with a score below 6 are classied as low-ability stu-
dents. Those with a score between 6 and 8 are classied as medium-ability
students.
Table 11 reports the results of re-estimating the relations between im-
patience, study results, and study e¤ort by ability. In all regressions we
include, in addition to the standard control variables, controls for ability,
risk attitude, and personality. The key nding is that the e¤ects of im-
patience seem concentrated among relatively able students, but the overall
pattern is not di¤erent than that observed for the sample as a whole. Also,
the estimated e¤ects of impatience on performance seem consistently smaller
in absolute value for students of medium ability. The e¤ects are also statis-
tically insignicant, but this may be due to the reduced sample size. A nal
point worth noting is that the e¤ect of impatience on e¤ort is not generally
negative, and nowhere close to signicant. So, the evidence suggests that
the relation between time preferences and academic performance is concen-
trated among relatively able students, and seems rather weak for mediocre
students.
4 Discussion
The overall picture that arises from our analyses is that impatient individuals
show weaker performance. Impatient students obtain lower grades and fail a
nal exam more often, suggesting that they put less e¤ort into their studies.
However, we nd no evidence that impatient students actually study fewer
hours or practice fewer exercises. We also do not nd clear di¤erences in
summer course participation. The question is how to reconcile these ndings.
where f(e; a) and c(e) denote, respectively, the future benets and present costs of study
e¤ort e, while a denotes ability and  captures patience. Assuming the problem is concave,
i.e. fe > 0, fee  0, ce > 0, and cee > 0, it is easily veried that the optimal e¤ort level
is increasing in patience :
de
d
=
fe
cee   fee > 0
The impact of a change in  on optimal e¤ort depends on the magnitude of the terms fe
and cee   fee. When ability is low, cee goes to innity when e¤ort approaches a natural
maximum, hence de
d
is small. When ability is high, fe may be close to zero, hence ded
may be close to zero. Alternatively, when ability and e¤ort are complements, fe may be
relatively high for able students.
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If impatient students do not study fewer hours, why do they obtain lower
grades?
Below we discuss a number of possible explanations that fall into three
di¤erent categories. The rst explanation is that impatient students have
a less e¢ cient learning style. That is, they do something di¤erent that ex-
plains why they perform worse while investing just as much time in their
studies. For example, they may concentrate less while studying than patient
students. The second explanation is that our measures of e¤ort ignore other
important dimensions of e¤ort that explain impatient studentsweaker per-
formance. For instance, impatient students might be less inclined to attend
lectures and study written course materials. The third explanation is that
impatient students are of lower unobserved ability: they exert just as much
e¤ort as patient students and do not di¤er in their learning style, but be-
cause of their lower ability they should have exerted more e¤ort to obtain
the same grade.
It is important to note that these explanations are related. We can think
of an ine¢ cient learning style as a lower ability to learn, or as a hard to ob-
serve e¤ort choice. For example, maintaining concentration while studying
can be considered as a dimension of e¤ort. Also, it is important to note
that these explanations are not necessarily inconsistent with the theoretical
prediction that impatient students exert less e¤ort. When performance dif-
ferences can be attributed to di¤erences in unobserved ability, it is still true
that impatient students exert less e¤ort once we take their true ability into
account. Likewise, when our measures of e¤ort ignore relevant dimensions
of e¤ort (and are not positively correlated with those dimensions), the per-
formance di¤erences indicate that there are in fact e¤ort di¤erences, and the
evidence is consistent with the theoretical prediction. We will now discuss
each of these explanations in more detail.
4.1 Di¤erences in learning style
First, consider the explanation that impatient individuals study less e¢ -
ciently because they have a di¤erent learning style. The analysis proceeds
as follows. We start out by investigating whether there are di¤erences in the
amount of time impatient students spend on each exercise in MyLab. Next,
we analyze di¤erences in the use of the electronic assistance tools "Help me
solve this" and "View an example". Then, we investigate di¤erences in the
allocation of study e¤ort over the course period. Finally, we briey touch
on survey evidence on di¤erences in learning styles.
We have already seen that there are no di¤erences in the amount of time
spent in MyLab as well as the number of exercises generated by MyLab. The
rst step in our analysis of learning styles is to combine these two measure
to estimate the e¤ect of impatience on the amount of time spent on each
exercise. The quantile regression results are reported in the rst column
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of Table 12. We nd that the category of most impatient students spends
less time per exercise.45 This rules out that impatient students spend more
time on other activities (such as communicating via Facebook or WhatsApp)
when they are logged in, since if that was the case we would expect them to
spend more time on each exercise. Rather, the results suggest that impatient
students study the exercises more supercially, which might explain why
impatient students show weaker performance despite similar levels of activity
in MyLab. However, controlling for time spent per exercise hardly a¤ects
the relation between impatience and the fraction of topics completed or
nal exam grades. This is illustrated in the second column of Table 12
for the fraction of topics completed. Moreover, the nding that impatient
students spend less time per exercise can only explain their relatively weak
performance if time spent per exercise is positively related to performance.
We nd no evidence that this is the case, however.46 A further reason why
it is unlikely that di¤erences in time spent per exercise explain our results is
that the estimated e¤ect is not very robust47 and the e¤ect size is not huge
(7% less time per exercise as compared to the most patient group).
To shed further light on di¤erences in activities in MyLab, we analyzed
the use of the electronic assistance tools "Help me solve this" and "View
an example". The distributions of these variables are shown in Figures A8
and A9. First, we assess whether there are absolute di¤erences in the use
impatient individuals make of the electronic assistance tools. We estimate
quantile regressions. As can be seen in columns 3 and 4 of Table 12, there
is no statistically signicant relationship.48 This underlines our previous
nding that there are no di¤erences in MyLab activity. Next, we investigate
whether there are di¤erences in the tendency to use the electronic assistance
tools relative to the number of exercises generated by MyLab. The results
are reported in columns 5 and 6 of Table 12. We nd no indication that
impatient students ask for guided solutions at a higher or lower rate per
exercise. Although we nd a statistically signicant positive e¤ect of impa-
tience on the number of sample problems per exercise, this relation does not
45This is perhaps surprising given that we do not nd statistically signicant di¤erences
in total time logged in and the number of exercises generated. However, the estimated
e¤ect of impatience on time logged in is negative, while the estimated e¤ect on the number
of exercises is positive. Dividing the two, the di¤erence becomes negative and large enough
to reach statistical signicance.
46 In the regression we control for time logged in and number of exercises generated. We
also do not nd a positive e¤ect of time per exercise when we drop those controls.
47For instance, the e¤ect becomes insignicant once we use the 0.33 or 0.75 quantile
in the quantile regression rather than the median. Likewise, estimated e¤ect sizes are
typically much smaller and statistically insignicant when we use OLS in combination
with di¤erent cut-o¤ rules to account for outliers.
48We assess the robustness of the estimates to outliers. We also assess the robustness to
censoring at zero (21 and 38 observations in case of guided solutions and sample problems,
respectively) by estimating a Tobit specication. This does not a¤ect the results.
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survive basic robustness checks.49 In light of these results, it is not surpris-
ing that di¤erences in the use of electronic assistance tools cannot explain
impatient studentsweaker performance.50
Another possibility is that impatient students spend their time less ef-
fectively, because they allocate their study e¤orts di¤erently over the course
period. Intuitively, one might expect that impatient individuals will be
more inclined to procrastinate, i.e. postpone their study e¤orts to the end
of the course period. Unfortunately, the MyLab data do not allow us to ob-
serve when precisely students were active. However, problems (topics) are
structured by weekly problem sets, and MyLab records information on time
logged in, number of exercises generated, and fraction of topics completed
by problem set. Assuming that students work on the problem sets in the
scheduled order, we might expect that procrastination leads to a relatively
low e¤ort on the topics discussed in the nal weeks of the course. Stu-
dents who procrastinate will be under higher time pressure when the exam
is coming up, and may therefore decide to spend less time on the nal weeks
problem set to free up time for more urgent study activities. We test this
in two ways. First, we estimate the relation between impatience and study
e¤ort for each of the weekly problem sets. The results are reported in Table
13. It is noteworthy that we nd a clear negative e¤ect of impatience on
time spent on the nal homework set (week 7), but this is not reected in
a lower number of exercises generated or a lower probability of completing
all topics in the nal homework set. Generally speaking, the association
between impatience and measures of study e¤ort does not become stronger
towards the end of the course period. For the second analysis to detect time
patterns we create a panel by pooling the weekly data. We then estimate a
panel regression with individual and time xed e¤ects, interacted with time
preferences, math entry test scores, and high school math education. By
doing so, we correct for all time-invariant unobservable characteristics that
a¤ect the level of e¤ort (but not for characteristics that a¤ect the changes
in e¤ort over the course period). The results are reported in Table 14. They
paint a very clear picture: the most impatient category of individuals gives
less attention to the nal homework set as compared to others. In an at-
tempt to reconcile this nding with the lack of a time pattern in Table 13,
we checked whether this divergence in ndings can be attributed to the dif-
ferent set of control variables. We nd no evidence that this is the case.
Importantly, we investigate whether time logged in to MyLab in week 7
and number of exercises generated in week 7 explain impatient students
weaker performance when we include them as additional control variables
49The relation becomes insignicant once we exclude three observations with the highest
rate of sample problems per exercise, or when we use OLS instead of median regression.
50When we include the requests for guided solutions ("Help me solve this") and sample
problems ("View an example") as controls in the analysis of exam grades or fraction of
topics completed, the estimated coe¢ cient of impatience is hardly a¤ected.
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in our analyses of performance di¤erences. Their inclusion does not a¤ect
the estimated e¤ect of impatience in any meaningful way. So, although the
data support the idea that impatient students allocate their study e¤orts
di¤erently over the course period, it does not seem to be a good explanation
for their relatively weak performance. Another reason why procrastination
is not a good explanation is that this specic setting is not very conducive
to such behavior. In the course QM1, the midterm exams provide strong
incentives to study the course material regularly.
Finally, we collected survey information on students learning styles.
We distinguish between six di¤erent learning styles using the learning style
model of Vermunt and Vermetten (2004). We do not nd any relation be-
tween time preferences and self-reported learning styles, and consequently
none of our results is a¤ected by the inclusion of learning styles in the re-
gressions.
4.2 Unobserved e¤ort dimensions
An alternative explanation for our ndings is that by concentrating on time
spent in an electronic learning environment, we ignore other important di-
mensions of study e¤ort that explain impatient students weaker perfor-
mance. Since MyLab o¤ers direct feedback and immediate rewards via text
messages ("Correct!, Good!, Congratulations!, Fantastic!, Excellent!"), im-
patient students may have a relatively strong preference for using MyLab
over studying written course materials, implying that we do not nd dif-
ferences in measured study e¤ort, despite di¤erences in total study e¤ort.51
Obviously, we do not have precise information on the e¤ort exerted outside
the electronic learning environment, but we have a number of indications
that render this explanation implausible. First, e¤ort in the electronic learn-
ing environment is related to grades in the regressions, suggesting that our
measures accurately reect total e¤ort. For example, di¤erences in time
spent in MyLab explain substantial di¤erences in the QM1 grade by na-
tionality.52 Second, we capture study e¤orts outside the electronic learning
51A related explanation for our ndings is that impatient students prepare just as well
for the exam as patient students, but they put in less e¤ort to obtain a good result during
the exam. This explanation would be in line with Borghans et al. (2008), who nd that
non-cognitive skills, including time preferences, inuence performance on cognitive tests,
even when those test are incentivized (see Segal, 2012, for a similar result). However, it
seems inconsistent to assume that impatient students have no di¢ culties with studying as
intensively as patient students, while at the same time assuming that they are not able
to put in similar e¤ort during the exam, when the marginal returns to e¤ort are so much
higher than when practicing. Moreover, impatient students are less likely to complete all
topics in MyLab, suggesting that they are less well prepared. We therefore do not think
this is a plausible explanation.
52As it turns out, students with German nationality do much better than other nation-
alities. Correcting for ability and personality, they earn on average a 0.55 point higher
exam grade in QM1. Correcting for time spent in MyLab, this di¤erence becomes 0.33
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environment by participation in the summer course, which is not related to
time preferences. Finally, we nd no di¤erences when we use the total num-
ber of study hours students report in our questionnaire. As self-reported
data may be hampered by measurement error we should be careful not to
overinterpret this result, but this nding is nevertheless suggestive.
4.3 Di¤erences in unobserved ability
The most plausible explanation is that impatient students are of lower un-
observed ability: they exert just as much e¤ort as patient students, but
should have exerted more e¤ort to obtain the same grade. As noted in the
introduction, previous studies have found that impatience is associated with
lower scores on intelligence tests (Frederick, 2005, Shamosh and Gray, 2008,
Dohmen et al., 2010). Assuming that unobserved ability is positively re-
lated to observed ability, the fact that impatience and ability, as measured
by the score on the mathematics entry test, are negatively correlated (r=
0.14) is in line with this explanation. Furthermore, it is suggestive that
we nd no relation between impatience and time spent in MyLab, whereas
we nd a negative relation between impatience and the percentage of top-
ics completed. These two measures are highly correlated (r=0.49), but an
important di¤erence between the two is that the former is somewhat nega-
tively related to the score on the math entry test (r=0.09), while the latter
is clearly positively correlated (r=0.18). Although these ndings do not pro-
vide conclusive evidence that time preferences capture unmeasured ability,
they are at least consistent with such an interpretation.53
5 Concluding remarks
We analyze the relation between time preferences, study e¤ort, and acad-
emic performance among rst-year business and economics students. We test
the hypothesis that impatient students exert less e¤ort, and consequently
show weaker academic performance. The main contribution of our study is
that we relate time preferences to direct measures of study e¤ort. We collect
information on study e¤orts of 794 students for an obligatory course in quan-
titative methods. In particular, we exploit data from an electronic learning
environment that records the time students are logged in, the number of
exercises generated by the system and whether students manage to solve at
and statistically insignicant (p=0.18).
53 It need not be intelligence per se, but can also be social background, which has been
related to academic performance as well as time preferences (see Björklund and Salvanes,
2011, for a review on the e¤ect of social background on educational attainment, and
Delaney and Doyle, 2012, for evidence on the link between time preferences and social
background). Social background can be interpreted as unobserved ability.
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least one exercise associated with a particular topic. Also, we have infor-
mation on whether students participate in an online summer course. Time
preferences are measured by stated preferences for an immediate payment
over larger delayed payments.
Our main nding is that there is no statistically signicant relationship
between students time preferences and the e¤ort they actually put into
their studies. We nd no statistically signicant relationship between time
preferences and the time students are logged in, the number of exercises
generated, and participation in the summer course. All estimated e¤ects
are close to zero. However, as the e¤ects are typically estimated with a
substantial margin of error, we cannot rule out the existence of small, but
meaningful e¤ects. Also, we nd evidence that impatient students are less
likely to complete all topics. This suggests that impatient students have a
lower understanding of the course material, but this cannot be attributed
to lower e¤ort in the sense of lower time investments or a lower number of
exercises generated.
In line with this nding and previous studies (Kirby et al., 2005, Cadena
and Keys, 2015, De Paola and Gioia, 2013, Golsteyn et al., 2014), we nd
a negative relation between impatience and the grade obtained on the nal
exam in quantitative methods, as well as exam grades obtained in other
rst-year courses. Moreover, impatient students fail nal exams more often
(excluding resit results). This e¤ect is statistically signicant and sizeable:
students who always prefer the immediate payment are estimated to fail 34%
more exams than other students who demonstrate a similar ability level at
the start of the academic year. This amounts to 0.5 additional failed exams
per year. The e¤ect of impatience is even larger when we acknowledge that
time preferences may also a¤ect performance via lower prior investments in
skills and knowledge: an estimated upper bound on this cumulative e¤ect is
55%. However, since we do not nd strong evidence that impatient students
exert less e¤ort, it is questionable to what extent their weaker performance
can be attributed to lower e¤ort.
The most plausible explanation for this result is that impatient students
are of lower unmeasured ability. Consistent with this interpretation and in
line with existing studies (Frederick, 2005, Shamosh and Gray, 2008, and
Dohmen et al., 2010), we nd that impatience is negatively correlated with
measures of ability. Consequently, to the extent that ability is unobserved
or measured with error, the estimated negative impact of impatience on
educational performance is larger than can be explained by di¤erences in
e¤ort. As an alternative explanation, we also nd some indication that im-
patient students have a less e¢ cient learning style. They seem to spend less
time per exercise and to invest less time studying the nal weeks homework
set. The latter nding suggests that they have a more tight time constraint
at the end of the course period when the exam date is approaching, which
suggests they procrastinate studying. However, time per exercise and study
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e¤ort on the nal homework set cannot account for the negative e¤ect of
impatience on performance. Regardless of which of those interpretations is
true, they both imply that impatient studentslower performance cannot be
fully attributed to lower study investments. It should be noted, however,
that our results are not necessarily inconsistent with the theoretical predic-
tion. Relative to their true ability, impatient students should have exerted
more e¤ort to obtain the same grade. In this sense, they exert little e¤ort.
Also, if impatient students concentrate less while studying, one could argue
that they exert less e¤ort in this unobserved dimension.
An important second nding is that we do not nd statistically signif-
icant di¤erences in study progress by the end of the rst year. Correcting
for ability di¤erences at the start of the academic year, impatient students
are not signicantly less likely to earn all study credits that can be earned
during the rst year. Moreover, they are not less likely to meet the uni-
versitys minimal requirements for rst years performance, even when we
ignore initial ability di¤erences. Apparently, they manage to avoid strong
adverse consequences often associated with impatience. In fact, their higher
probability of passing on the resit is consistent with their time preferences,
as they may prefer postponing study e¤ort, and consider study delay as
more costly.
When interpreting these results, we should keep in mind that they are
derived in a specic setting. Students face strong incentives to study reg-
ularly, as in most courses they have the opportunity to take at least one
midterm test and they are required to attend weekly tutorials, where active
participation is expected. In this sense, this is a strong test of the hypothesis
that impatient students put less e¤ort into their studies. Also, our nding
that impatient students do not obtain signicantly fewer study credits by
the end of the rst year should be seen in the context of our sample of
university students, who are arguably more sophisticated in dealing with
impulsive tendencies than the general population (see De Paola and Gioia,
2013, for similar ndings in a similar context). Nevertheless, the fact that
we nd substantial e¤ects of impatience on grades and nal exam results,
despite insignicant di¤erences in study activity, calls into question whether
impatient individualsweak performance is actually driven by low study ef-
fort, or reects a lower unobserved ability or perhaps an ine¢ cient learning
style. Previous literature may sometimes have too easily inferred di¤erences
in e¤ort from di¤erences in performance. This underlines the value of taking
a di¤erent perspective by using direct measures of study e¤ort.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean Std dev.  Median Min Max
Effort related variables:
Time logged in to MyLab (total hours) 59.0 25.9 55.3 1.1 164.6
Number of exercises generated by MyLab 464.8 200.7 453.0 0 2178
Participated in summer course (yes=1, no=0) 0.20 0.40 0 0 1
Fraction of topics completed 0.87 0.22 0.98 0.01 1
Completed all topics (yes=1, no=0) 0.24 0.43 0 0 1
Performance related variables
Grade final exam in QM1 7.1 2.2 7 1.5 10
Failed final exam in QM1 (fail=1, pass=0) 0.25 0.43 0 0 1
GPA all courses except QM1 6.6 1.3 6.6 1.9 9.5
Number of failed exams (excluding QM1) 1.6 1.9 1 0 8
ECTS 48.4 17.1 60 0 60
Obtained all ECTS (yes=1, no=0) 0.53 0.50 1 0 1
Received a negative bsa (yes=1, no=0) 0.16 0.37 0 0 1
Learning style related variables
Time logged in per exercise 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.04 2.31
Guided solutions 73.0 95.1 40 0 1049
Sample problems 184.7 112 182 0 598
Guided solutions per exercise 0.15 0.17 0.10 0 2.50
Sample problems per exercise 0.43 0.31 0.40 0 3.36
N=794  except for exam results in QM1 (N=788), time logged in per exercise (N=790), guided solutions and 
sample problems (N=765),  guided solutions per exercise and sample problems per exercise (N=762).
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Table 3: Study efforts: time logged in to MyLab 
 
Method: Quantile Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Switch when delayed is €1250 4.24* 2.46 3.65 3.64
(2.34) (2.39) (2.25) (2.32)
Always Immediate ‐0.03 ‐0.41 ‐1.15 ‐0.02
(2.64) (2.73) (2.58) (2.66)
Mathematics major ‐0.47 ‐2.46 ‐1.36
(2.33) (2.20) (2.28)
Score on math entry test= 0 to 3
Score on math entry test= 4 to 5 0.95 ‐0.73 ‐1.27
(3.84) (3.60) (3.71)
Score on math entry test= 6 to 7 ‐4.91 ‐5.76 ‐7.15*
(3.84) (3.63) (3.73)
Score on math entry test= 8 to 9 ‐2.62 ‐2.76 ‐3.65
(3.93) (3.70) (3.81)
Score on math entry test= 10 to 11 ‐3.04 ‐6.24 ‐6.37
(4.35) (4.11) (4.24)
Score on math entry test= 12 to 14 ‐4.69 ‐6.59 ‐5.39
(5.64) (5.34) (5.51)
Score on statistics entry test= 0
Score on statistics entry test= 1 ‐3.35 ‐4.28 ‐5.10
(3.41) (3.20) (3.29)
Score on statistics entry test=2 ‐3.99 ‐8.46*** ‐9.04***
(3.42) (3.23) (3.32)
Score on statistics entry test= 3 ‐4.96 ‐5.69* ‐6.05*
(3.55) (3.34) (3.44)
Score on statistics entry test=4 ‐8.70** ‐11.92*** ‐13.31***
(4.23) (3.98) (4.10)
Score on statistics entry test= 5 ‐3.12 ‐3.19 ‐4.13
(6.08) (5.75) (5.91)
Score on statistics entry test= 6 to 7 7.60 4.62 4.14
(9.21) (8.68) (8.95)
Summer course 6.09**
(2.58)
Demographics yes yes yes yes
Personality no no yes yes
Observations 794 794 794 794
Pseudo r2 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.14
Control variables:
Demographics: gender, age nationality, study program, and whether the tutor is staff member or teaching assistant.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate significance as follows: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, 
*p<0.1. The quantile used in the regression is the median.
Total hours logged in to MyLab
Always delayed or switch when delayed is €1100 Reference
Reference
Reference
Personality: risk attitude, anxiety, persistence, self‐belief.
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Method: Quantile Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Switch when delayed is €1250 2.32 ‐0.21 ‐0.93 ‐0.18
(12.38) (13.73) (13.41) (13.18)
Always Immediate 24.47* 18.09 10.84 10.40
(13.98) (15.65) (15.38) (15.12)
Mathematics major ‐29.86** ‐26.76** ‐26.82**
(13.36) (13.08) (12.97)
Score on math entry test= 0 to 3
Score on math entry test= 4 to 5 ‐22.97 ‐22.91 ‐21.82
(22.01) (21.47) (21.11)
Score on math entry test= 6 to 7 ‐2.07 7.02 8.13
(22.05) (21.61) (21.25)
Score on math entry test= 8 to 9 ‐18.53 ‐13.79 ‐13.05
(22.56) (22.07) (21.69)
Score on math entry test= 10 to 11 ‐14.00 ‐11.85 ‐9.78
(24.96) (24.50) (24.15)
Score on math entry test= 12 to 14 ‐33.40 ‐25.88 ‐25.25
(32.33) (31.84) (31.33)
Score on statistics entry test= 0
Score on statistics entry test= 1 ‐10.60 9.63 9.26
(19.54) (19.07) (18.74)
Score on statistics entry test=2 ‐15.68 ‐17.63 ‐18.09
(19.62) (19.22) (18.90)
Score on statistics entry test= 3 ‐37.68* ‐29.73 ‐29.63
(20.34) (19.91) (19.60)
Score on statistics entry test=4 ‐50.81** ‐44.25* ‐47.11**
(24.29) (23.74) (23.34)
Score on statistics entry test= 5 ‐21.20 ‐31.17 ‐30.43
(34.87) (34.22) (33.65)
Score on statistics entry test= 6 to 7 ‐3.03 3.12 4.63
(52.83) (51.71) (50.90)
Summer course ‐2.43
(14.68)
Demographics yes yes yes yes
Personality no no yes yes
Observations 794 794 794 794
Pseudo r2 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05
Control variables:
Demographics: gender, age nationality, study program, and whether the tutor is staff member or teaching assistant.
Personality: risk attitude, anxiety, persistence, self‐belief.
Number of exercises generated by MyLab
Always delayed or switch when delayed is €1100 Reference
Reference
Reference
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate significance as follows: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, 
*p<0.1. The quantile used in the regression is the median.
Table 4: Study efforts: number of exercises generated by MyLab 
 
 
 
 
38
Method: Probit (1=completed all topics)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Switch when delayed is €1250 ‐0.028 ‐0.014 ‐0.002 ‐0.008
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.031)
Always Immediate ‐0.128*** ‐0.104*** ‐0.088** ‐0.092***
(0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.033)
Mathematics major 0.006 ‐0.014 0.001
(0.034) (0.033) (0.032)
Score on math entry test= 0 to 3
Score on math entry test= 4 to 5 0.002 0.000 ‐0.004
(0.060) (0.057) (0.055)
Score on math entry test= 6 to 7 0.067 0.062 0.044
(0.065) (0.064) (0.060)
Score on math entry test= 8 to 9 0.096 0.078 0.068
(0.067) (0.065) (0.062)
Score on math entry test= 10 to 11 0.269*** 0.235*** 0.230***
(0.082) (0.081) (0.081)
Score on math entry test= 12 to 14 0.206* 0.157 0.189*
(0.106) (0.102) (0.108)
Score on statistics entry test= 0
Score on statistics entry test= 1 ‐0.003 0.001 ‐0.001
(0.049) (0.049) (0.046)
Score on statistics entry test=2 0.032 0.026 0.024
(0.051) (0.050) (0.047)
Score on statistics entry test= 3 0.013 0.030 0.036
(0.053) (0.054) (0.053)
Score on statistics entry test=4 ‐0.002 ‐0.004 0.005
(0.062) (0.059) (0.058)
Score on statistics entry test= 5 0.074 0.136 0.145
(0.099) (0.108) (0.111)
Score on statistics entry test= 6 to 7 ‐0.014 ‐0.040 ‐0.060
(0.126) (0.112) (0.090)
Summer course 0.019
(0.036)
Demographics yes yes yes yes
Personality no no yes yes
Study effort no no no yes
Observations 794 794 794 794
Pseudo r2 0.07 0.10 0.16 0.20
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate significance as follows: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Control variables:
Demographics: gender, age nationality, study program, and whether the tutor is staff member or teaching assistant.
Personality: risk attitude, anxiety, persistence, self‐belief.
Study effort: We include separate dummies for each quintile of the distributions of time in MyLab and number of exercises 
generated by MyLab, respectively.
All topics completed
Always delayed or switch when delayed is €1100 Reference
Reference
Reference
Table 5: Study efforts: fraction of topics completed in MyLab 
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Method: Probit (1=participation)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Switch when delayed is €1250 ‐0.010 ‐0.013 ‐0.050 0.016
(0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.044)
Always Immediate 0.003 ‐0.007 ‐0.058* 0.027
(0.037) (0.036) (0.035) (0.051)
Mathematics major ‐0.086***
(0.027)
Demographics yes yes yes yes
Personality no yes yes yes
Observations 794 794 266 528
Observations  dep. var.=1 161 161 37 124
Observations dep. var.=0 633 633 229 404
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.09
Control variables:
Demographics: gender, age nationality, and study program.
Personality: risk attitude, anxiety, persistence, self‐belief.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate significance as follows: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, 
*p<0.1.
Participation in summer course
Sample: Math 
major
Sample: Math 
minor
Always delayed or switch when delayed is €1100 Reference
 
Table 6: Study efforts: participation in summer course 
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Method: Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Switch when delayed is €1250 ‐0.379* ‐0.204 ‐0.169 ‐0.249 ‐0.135 ‐0.077
(0.217) (0.193) (0.187) (0.183) (0.166) (0.156)
Always Immediate ‐1.240*** ‐0.789*** ‐0.639*** ‐0.618*** ‐0.432** ‐0.356**
(0.232) (0.210) (0.204) (0.197) (0.180) (0.169)
Mathematics major 0.897*** 0.794*** 0.789*** 0.649*** 0.498***
(0.187) (0.186) (0.184) (0.163) (0.150)
Score on math entry test= 0 to 3
Score on math entry test= 4 to 5 0.749*** 0.748*** 0.739*** 0.452* 0.324
(0.278) (0.279) (0.269) (0.250) (0.247)
Score on math entry test= 6 to 7 1.177*** 1.071*** 1.003*** 0.556** 0.303
(0.281) (0.283) (0.277) (0.252) (0.250)
Score on math entry test= 8 to 9 2.007*** 1.887*** 1.755*** 1.135*** 0.613**
(0.296) (0.295) (0.288) (0.268) (0.272)
Score on math entry test= 10 to 11 2.884*** 2.692*** 2.549*** 1.736*** 1.226***
(0.338) (0.333) (0.329) (0.303) (0.304)
Score on math entry test= 12 to 14 2.847*** 2.592*** 2.540*** 1.805*** 0.998**
(0.456) (0.476) (0.481) (0.443) (0.431)
Score on statistics entry test= 0
Score on statistics entry test= 1 ‐0.233 ‐0.216 ‐0.174 ‐0.006 0.055
(0.265) (0.263) (0.259) (0.237) (0.228)
Score on statistics entry test=2 ‐0.434* ‐0.374 ‐0.418 ‐0.279 ‐0.110
(0.257) (0.257) (0.254) (0.237) (0.228)
Score on statistics entry test= 3 ‐0.079 0.025 ‐0.008 0.063 0.189
(0.279) (0.277) (0.273) (0.253) (0.239)
Score on statistics entry test=4 0.203 0.277 0.317 0.450 0.495*
(0.346) (0.341) (0.320) (0.287) (0.273)
Score on statistics entry test= 5 0.856* 0.947** 0.857** 0.909** 0.956**
(0.451) (0.433) (0.431) (0.395) (0.409)
Score on statistics entry test= 6 to 7 2.006** 1.864** 1.535* 1.607** 1.458*
(0.891) (0.815) (0.838) (0.788) (0.757)
Expected grade 0.726***
(0.089)
Demographics yes yes yes yes yes yes
Personality no no yes yes yes yes
Study effort no no no yes yes yes
Fraction of topics completed in MyLab no no no no yes yes
Observations 788 788 788 788 788 788
Pseudo r2 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.17
Control variables:
Demographics: gender, age nationality, study program, and whether the tutor is staff member or teaching assistant
Grade final exam in QM1
The dependent variable is final exam grades. Grades obtained in resit exams are excluded.
Always delayed or switch when delayed is €1100
Fraction of topics completed in MyLab: we include dummies for 5 categories.
Personality: risk attitude, anxiety, persistence, self‐belief
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate significance as follows: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Study effort: An indicator variable on participation in the summer course, time in MyLab and number of exercises generated by MyLab. 
For the latter two variables, we include a separate dummy for each quintile of the distribution.
Reference
Reference
Reference
Table 7: Performance: grade final exam in QM1 
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Method: Probit (1=fail, 0=pass)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Switch when delayed is €1250 0.045 0.022 0.020 0.039 0.021 0.015
(0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.031) (0.030)
Always Immediate 0.160*** 0.097** 0.076* 0.074* 0.047 0.040
(0.045) (0.043) (0.042) (0.041) (0.036) (0.035)
Mathematics major ‐0.138*** ‐0.129*** ‐0.139*** ‐0.119*** ‐0.102***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.025) (0.025)
Score on math entry test= 0 to 3
Score on math entry test= 4 to 5 ‐0.108*** ‐0.107*** ‐0.104*** ‐0.066* ‐0.053
(0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.035) (0.035)
Score on math entry test= 6 to 7 ‐0.155*** ‐0.142*** ‐0.129*** ‐0.078** ‐0.056
(0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035)
Score on math entry test= 8 to 9 ‐0.223*** ‐0.213*** ‐0.191*** ‐0.125*** ‐0.089***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.031) (0.034)
Score on math entry test= 10 to 11 ‐0.231*** ‐0.218*** ‐0.197*** ‐0.138*** ‐0.111***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.030)
Score on math entry test= 12 to 14 ‐0.223*** ‐0.211*** ‐0.198*** ‐0.157*** ‐0.140***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
Score on statistics entry test= 0
Score on statistics entry test= 1 0.076 0.080 0.071 0.051 0.053
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.050) (0.050)
Score on statistics entry test=2 0.061 0.063 0.069 0.057 0.041
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.052) (0.050)
Score on statistics entry test= 3 0.078 0.073 0.074 0.067 0.055
(0.060) (0.059) (0.060) (0.056) (0.055)
Score on statistics entry test=4 0.058 0.048 0.045 0.029 0.023
(0.072) (0.070) (0.068) (0.062) (0.059)
Score on statistics entry test= 5 ‐0.095 ‐0.091 ‐0.055 ‐0.056 ‐0.058
(0.080) (0.078) (0.085) (0.069) (0.073)
Score on statistics entry test= 6 to 7 ‐0.095 ‐0.085 ‐0.048 ‐0.031 ‐0.025
(0.107) (0.099) (0.118) (0.127) (0.130)
Expected grade ‐0.072***
(0.019)
Demographics yes yes yes yes yes yes
Personality no no yes yes yes yes
Study effort no no no yes yes yes
Fraction of topics completed in MyLab no no no no yes yes
Observations 788 788 788 788 788 788
Pseudo r2 0.05 0.17 0.19 0.24 0.33 0.36
Control variables:
Demographics: gender, age nationality, study program, and whether the tutor is staff member or teaching assistant
Failed final exam in QM1
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate significance as follows: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Study effort: An indicator variable for participation in the summer course, time in MyLab and number of exercises generated by MyLab. 
For the latter two variables, we include a separate dummy for each quintile of the distribution.
The dependent variable is whether a student passed or failed the final exam in QM1. Resit exam results are excluded.
Fraction of topics completed in MyLab: we include dummies for 5 categories.
Reference
Reference
ReferenceAlways delayed or switch when delayed is €1100
Personality: risk attitude, anxiety, persistence, self‐belief
Table 8: Performance: probability of failing exam in QM1 
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Method: OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Switch when delayed is €1250 ‐0.070 ‐0.005 0.022 ‐0.016 0.028 0.053
(0.108) (0.103) (0.100) (0.100) (0.094) (0.089)
Always Immediate ‐0.532*** ‐0.377*** ‐0.288** ‐0.280** ‐0.185* ‐0.152
(0.116) (0.114) (0.113) (0.111) (0.102) (0.098)
Mathematics major 0.112 0.061 0.073 0.005 ‐0.078
(0.097) (0.096) (0.099) (0.090) (0.086)
Score on math entry test= 0 to 3
Score on math entry test= 4 to 5 0.221 0.223 0.219 0.071 0.008
(0.154) (0.153) (0.150) (0.137) (0.143)
Score on math entry test= 6 to 7 0.298* 0.239 0.229 ‐0.005 ‐0.125
(0.154) (0.153) (0.152) (0.140) (0.146)
Score on math entry test= 8 to 9 0.628*** 0.567*** 0.531*** 0.222 ‐0.026
(0.162) (0.161) (0.160) (0.149) (0.155)
Score on math entry test= 10 to 11 1.161*** 1.053*** 1.023*** 0.618*** 0.378**
(0.178) (0.175) (0.176) (0.167) (0.168)
Score on math entry test= 12 to 14 0.943*** 0.829*** 0.819*** 0.403* 0.012
(0.221) (0.227) (0.233) (0.219) (0.221)
Score on statistics entry test= 0
Score on statistics entry test= 1 0.025 0.033 0.049 0.123 0.147
(0.145) (0.142) (0.141) (0.132) (0.125)
Score on statistics entry test=2 ‐0.005 0.025 0.016 0.067 0.144
(0.146) (0.144) (0.144) (0.135) (0.128)
Score on statistics entry test= 3 0.193 0.247* 0.242* 0.260* 0.308**
(0.148) (0.146) (0.146) (0.137) (0.129)
Score on statistics entry test=4 0.334* 0.373** 0.410** 0.455*** 0.459***
(0.171) (0.166) (0.162) (0.151) (0.142)
Score on statistics entry test= 5 0.348 0.365 0.356 0.386* 0.390*
(0.242) (0.229) (0.238) (0.222) (0.220)
Score on statistics entry test= 6 to 7 0.826** 0.741** 0.635* 0.660** 0.532*
(0.377) (0.329) (0.326) (0.310) (0.280)
Expected grade 0.352***
(0.049)
Demographics yes yes yes yes yes yes
Personality no no yes yes yes yes
Study effort no no no yes yes yes
Fraction of topics completed in MyLab no no no no yes yes
Observations 794 794 794 794 794 794
Pseudo r2 0.11 0.20 0.24 0.27 0.38 0.43
Control variables:
Demographics: gender, age, nationality, and study program.
Personality: risk attitude, anxiety, persistence, self‐belief
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate significance as follows: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Study effort: An indicator variable for participation in the summer course, time in MyLab and number of exercises generated by MyLab. 
For the latter two variables, we include a separate dummy for each quintile of the distribution.
Fraction of topics completed in MyLab: we include dummies for 5 categories.
The dependent variable is a student's GPA of final exams in all courses except QM1. Resit exam results are excluded.
GPA of final exams in all courses except QM1
Always delayed or switch when delayed is €1100 Reference
Reference
Reference
Table 9: Performance: GPA in all courses except for QM1 
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Method: Ols
Dependent Variable: Number of 
ECTS (if <60) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Switch when delayed is €1250 0.021 ‐0.024 0.017 0.041 1.930 ‐0.030 ‐0.048*
(0.114) (0.111) (0.042) (0.043) (2.311) (0.030) (0.027)
Always Immediate 0.437*** 0.290** ‐0.135*** ‐0.070 0.594 0.054 0.002
(0.125) (0.121) (0.047) (0.050) (2.218) (0.036) (0.031)
Mathematics major ‐0.163 0.054 4.372** ‐0.080***
(0.108) (0.043) (2.041) (0.025)
Score on math entry test= 0 to 3
Score on math entry test= 4 to 5 ‐0.247 0.085 1.653 ‐0.023
(0.164) (0.069) (3.031) (0.036)
Score on math entry test= 6 to 7 ‐0.220 0.126* 3.237 ‐0.036
(0.165) (0.067) (3.229) (0.035)
Score on math entry test= 8 to 9 ‐0.413** 0.218*** 2.722 ‐0.075**
(0.172) (0.066) (3.334) (0.033)
Score on math entry test= 10 to 11 ‐0.933*** 0.225*** 8.245** ‐0.088***
(0.199) (0.069) (3.693) (0.031)
Score on math entry test= 12 to 14 ‐0.479* 0.254*** 11.241*** ‐0.124***
(0.255) (0.084) (4.189) (0.023)
Score on statistics entry test= 0
Score on statistics entry test= 1 ‐0.030 0.001 ‐3.225 0.023
(0.149) (0.062) (2.863) (0.042)
Score on statistics entry test=2 ‐0.101 ‐0.018 ‐0.701 0.024
(0.152) (0.062) (2.861) (0.043)
Score on statistics entry test= 3 ‐0.243 ‐0.006 ‐2.855 0.039
(0.159) (0.064) (2.919) (0.046)
Score on statistics entry test=4 ‐0.465** 0.015 3.651 ‐0.033
(0.193) (0.076) (3.544) (0.042)
Score on statistics entry test= 5 ‐0.468* 0.046 6.387
(0.282) (0.105) (5.031)
Score on statistics entry test= 5 to 7 ‐0.093***
(0.034)
Score on statistics entry test= 6 to 7 ‐0.839* 0.400*** 10.545*
(0.467) (0.074) (5.478)
Demographics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Personality no yes no yes yes no yes
Study effort no no no no no no no
Fraction of topics completed in MyLab no no no no no no no
Observations 794 794 794 794 373 794 794
Pseudo r2 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.15 0.04 0.13
Control variables:
Always delayed or switch when delayed 
is €1100 Reference
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate significance as follows: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. In 
columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is the number of final exams failed, excluding the course QM1 and resit exams. In column 
(7), we merge the two top categories for the score on the statistics entry test, as the top category predicts failure perfectly. 
Demographics: gender, age, nationality, and study program.
Reference
Reference
Personality: risk attitude, anxiety, persistence, self‐belief
Neg. Binomial Regression Probit Probit
Number of failed final 
exams
Obtained all ECTS  Received negative BSA
Table 10: Impatience and first-year academic performance 
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 Table 11: Estimation results by ability 
 
  
Dependent variable Total hours Number Grade Probability GPA  Number of ECTS  probability
logged in  of exercises QM1 of failing failed of negative
to MyLab generated exam QM1 exams BSA
Method tobit probit ols neg. binomial probit probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
‐0.377 10.419 0.061 0.026 0.086 ‐0.120 0.107 ‐0.017
(3.862) (19.390) (0.362) (0.021) (0.181) (0.261) (0.071) (0.027)
Always Immediate ‐4.000 11.179 ‐1.101*** 0.100 ‐0.569** 0.571* ‐0.071 ‐0.014
(5.054) (25.374) (0.393) (0.065) (0.246) (0.312) (0.098) (0.031)
Observations 236 236 234 215 236 236 236 236
3.300 ‐32.550 0.035 ‐0.049 0.004 ‐0.072 0.013 ‐0.026
(3.215) (24.102) (0.302) (0.053) (0.169) (0.188) (0.072) (0.043)
Always Immediate 4.413 ‐13.155 ‐0.339 0.044 ‐0.124 0.177 ‐0.073 0.020
(3.482) (26.109) (0.327) (0.059) (0.179) (0.197) (0.078) (0.047)
Observations 299 299 298 298 299 299 299 299
5.965 47.894 ‐0.472 0.088 ‐0.040 0.061 0.031 ‐0.080
(5.230) (32.301) (0.301) (0.081) (0.190) (0.163) (0.080) (0.064)
Always Immediate 4.282 59.153* ‐0.748** 0.112 ‐0.301 0.249 ‐0.069 ‐0.029
(5.622) (34.725) (0.327) (0.086) (0.193) (0.171) (0.083) (0.069)
Observations 259 259 256 253 259 259 253 256
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate significance as follows: ***p<0.01, 
**p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Low ability (score on math entrytest<6)
Always delayed or switch 
when delayed is €1100 Reference
 In all regressions, we control for age, gender, nationality, study program, whether the tutor is a  staff member (in case 
of QM1), entry test scores on mathematics and statistics (dummies as in the analyses on the whole sample), pre‐
education, risk attitude, anxiety, persistence, and self‐belief.
Switch when delayed is 
€1250
Results in other courses
Always delayed or switch 
when delayed is €1100
Always delayed or switch 
when delayed is €1100
Study Effort
High ability (score on math entrytest >8)
Reference
Reference
Results in QM1
Medium ability (score on math entry test from 6 to 8)
quantile reg.
Switch when delayed is 
€1250
Switch when delayed is 
€1250
45
Method: Quantile reg. Probit
Dependent Variable: Time per 
exercise
All topics 
completed
Guided 
Solutions
Sample 
Problems
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Switch when delayed is €1250 0.01*** ‐0.01 ‐7.84 10.23 0.00 0.01
(0.00) (0.03) (7.08) (8.62) (0.01) (0.02)
Always Immediate ‐0.01** ‐0.09*** ‐5.11 0.90 ‐0.02 0.03**
(0.00) (0.03) (7.94) (10.46) (0.01) (0.02)
Mathematics major 0.01*** ‐0.00 ‐20.39*** ‐33.37*** ‐0.02* ‐0.03**
(0.00) (0.03) (6.01) (8.85) (0.01) (0.02)
Time per exercise first quintile Reference
Time per exercise second quintile ‐0.04
(0.05)
Time per exercise third quintile 0.06
(0.07)
Time per exercise fourth quintile 0.08
(0.10)
Time per exercise fifth quintile 0.12
(0.15)
Score on entry tests math and statistics yes yes yes yes yes yes
Demographics yes yes yes yes yes yes
Personality yes yes yes yes yes yes
Study effort no yes no no yes yes
Observations 790 790 765 765 762 762
Pseudo r2 0.06 0.20 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.15
Control variables:
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate significance as follows: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
The quantile used in the regressions is the median. In column (2), the estimation method is probit. The dependent variable 
takes the value one if all topics are completed and zero otherwise.
Demographics: gender, age, nationality, and study program.
Personality: risk attitude, anxiety, persistence, self‐belief
Study effort: An indicator variable on participation in the summer course, time in MyLab and number of exercises generated 
by MyLab. For the latter two variables, we include a separate dummy for each quintile of the distribution. 
Score on entry tests math and statistics: we include a separate dummy for 6 (7) categories of the math (statistics) entry test.
Quantile regression
Guided 
Solutions per 
exercise
Sample 
problems per 
exercise
Always delayed or switch when 
delayed is €1100 Reference
Table 12: Differences in learning styles 
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Method: Quantile Regression
week 1 week 2 week 3 week 4 week 5 week 6 week 7
Switch when delayed is €1250 ‐0.096 0.050 0.409 1.088** 0.859** 0.448** ‐0.109
(0.257) (0.196) (0.364) (0.542) (0.420) (0.204) (0.332)
Always Immediate 0.143 0.041 ‐0.391 0.203 ‐0.191 0.236 ‐1.028***
(0.278) (0.213) (0.404) (0.439) (0.531) (0.281) (0.356)
Observations 794 794 794 794 794 794 794
Pseudo r2 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.08
Method: Quantile Regression
week 1 week 2 week 3 week 4 week 5 week 6 week 7
Switch when delayed is €1250 ‐0.884 0.225 2.059 1.036 0.380 1.275 ‐1.876
(1.513) (0.888) (1.967) (2.277) (1.461) (0.878) (1.590)
Always Immediate 5.445*** 1.996 3.168 ‐1.167 5.090* 3.602*** ‐1.060
(1.811) (1.271) (3.387) (2.660) (2.906) (1.351) (2.182)
Observations 794 794 794 794 794 794 794
Pseudo r2 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.04
Method: probit (1=all topics completed)
week 1 week 2 week 3 week 4 week 5 week 6 week 7
Switch when delayed is €1250 ‐0.052 ‐0.089** ‐0.057 ‐0.085* ‐0.058 ‐0.069 ‐0.009
(0.039) (0.042) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.036)
Always Immediate ‐0.042 ‐0.064 ‐0.117** ‐0.088* ‐0.142*** ‐0.102** ‐0.065
(0.045) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.048) (0.050) (0.041)
Observations 794 794 794 794 794 794 794
Pseudo r2 0.20 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.14
Hours logged into MyLab by weekly problem set
Reference
Number of exercises generated by weekly problem set
Always delayed or switch when delayed is €1100 Reference
Always delayed or switch when delayed is €1100
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate significance as follows: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
Coefficients of probit models report mean marginal effects. Quantile regressions use the median. In all regressions, we control for age, 
gender, nationality, study program, whether the tutor is a staff member (in case of QM1), entry test scores on mathematics and 
statistics (dummies as in the analyses on the whole sample), mathematics major, risk attitude, anxiety, persistence, and self‐belief.
Always delayed or switch when delayed is €1100
All topics completed by weekly problem set
Reference
Table 13: Study effort by weekly problem set  
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Method: Fixed‐effects regression
(1) (2) (3)
week 2 * Switch when delayed is €1250 0.034 1.331 0.007
(0.271) (1.960) (0.008)
week 3 * Switch when delayed is €1250 0.306 1.240 0.017
(0.355) (3.112) (0.011)
week 4 * Switch when delayed is €1250 0.656 1.460 0.018
(0.443) (2.888) (0.014)
week 5* Switch when delayed is €1250 0.647 ‐1.775 0.013
(0.490) (2.876) (0.017)
week 6 * Switch when delayed is €1250 0.179 1.253 0.024
(0.347) (2.537) (0.019)
week 7 * Switch when delayed is €1250 ‐0.249 ‐1.976 0.004
(0.420) (2.866) (0.021)
week 2 * Always Immediate ‐0.070 ‐3.260 ‐0.005
(0.310) (2.055) (0.009)
week 3 * Always Immediate 0.063 1.405 ‐0.008
(0.426) (3.963) (0.014)
week 4 * Always Immediate ‐0.708 ‐3.861 ‐0.025
(0.494) (4.121) (0.018)
week 5 * Always Immediate ‐0.379 ‐0.622 ‐0.054**
(0.588) (3.896) (0.024)
week 6 * Always Immediate ‐0.517 ‐2.888 ‐0.051**
(0.392) (3.259) (0.026)
week 7 * Always Immediate ‐1.544*** ‐8.091** ‐0.081***
(0.472) (3.503) (0.028)
Individual fixed effects yes yes yes
Week fixed effects yes yes yes
Week fixed effects * Math entry test score yes yes yes
Week fixed effects * Math major yes yes yes
Observations 5,558 5,558 5,558
Number of individuals 794 794 794
r2 0.38 0.34 0.20
Hours logged into 
MyLab by weekly 
problem set
Number of 
exercises by 
weekly problem 
set
Fraction of topics 
completed by 
weekly problem 
set
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate significance as follows: ***p<0.01, 
**p<0.05, *p<0.1. All regressions include individual and week fixed effects. 
Table 14: Individual fixed-effects regressions of study efforts by weekly problem set  
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Figures 
Figure 1: Distribution of time logged in to MyLab 
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of number of exercises generated by MyLab 
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Appendix: Figures 
 
Figure A1: Distribution of time preferences 
 
 
Figure A2: Distribution of entry test scores mathematics 
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Figure A3: Distribution of fraction of topics completed 
 
 
Figure A4: Distribution of final exam grades in QM1 
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Figure A5: Distribution of GPA final exams (excluding grade QM1 and resits) 
 
 
Figure A6: Distribution of the number of failed final exams (excluding exam results in 
QM1 and resits) 
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Figure A7: Distribution of study credits (ECTS) earned 
 
 
Figure A8: Distribution of requests for a guided solution in MyLab (“Help me solve 
this”) 
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Figure A9: Distribution of sample problems generated by MyLab in the final attempt 
(“View an Example”) 
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